

Background Paper

Parliamentary Oversight of Security Sector IN PAKISTAN

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Printed in Pakistan

Published: October 2010

ISBN: 978-969-558-183-4

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Published by



Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency - PILDAT

Head Office: No. 7, 9th Avenue, F-8/1, Islamabad, Pakistan

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

COAS	Chief of Army Staff
DCC	Defence Committee of the Cabinet
DG	Director General
FSF	Federal Security Force
GHQ	General Headquarters
IB	Intelligence Bureau
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JCSC	Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
MI	Military Intelligence
MQM	Muttahida Quami Movement
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
PCNS	Parliamentary Committee on National Security
PM	Prime Minister
PMA	Pakistan Military Academy
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PONAM:	Pakistan Oppressed Nationalities Movement
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party

PREFACE

Parliamentary Control and Oversight of the Defence Sector in Pakistan, though an accepted democratic principle in the world, has not been able to take firm root due to peculiar civil-military relations in Pakistan. What are its prospects today in the framework of a sustainable democracy in Pakistan?

Mr. Mushahid Hussain Sayed, former Senator and Federal Minister, answers the question through this paper that he authored in October 2010. This paper also contains the author's comprehensive, originally conceived and meticulously-prepared *Fact-Sheet on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan* since 1947 to date, the first such detailed document on this subject.

The paper has been commissioned by PILDAT in order to assist Pakistan's Parliamentary Committees on Defence in the discharge of their roles of control and oversight of defence and to sustain a debate in the public domain on civilian control of the defence sector in Pakistan for a sustainable democracy.

Acknowledgements


PILDAT wishes to acknowledge the support provided by the United States Institute of Peace towards PILDAT's larger programme of *Research and Dialogue on Civil-Military Relations for Conflict Prevention in Pakistan*. The paper has been prepared under this project.

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Islamabad
October 2010

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Mr. Mushahid Hussain Sayed

Mushahid Hussain Sayed is Secretary General of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). He has been a Cabinet Minister, a journalist, a university teacher and a political analyst. In 1982, at age 29, he became the youngest Editor of a major national newspaper in Pakistan, The Muslim, an independent, English daily published from Islamabad. In his capacity as a journalist, he wrote extensively on civil-military relations. Prior to that, he served on the faculty of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College as Member, Directing Staff, training new foreign service officers.

He has served as an Information Minister from 1997 to 1999 and also Leader of Pakistan's delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1993. After October 12, 1999, he was held without any charges as a political prisoner for 440 days, including a period in solitary imprisonment. The world's leading human rights organization, the Amnesty International, declared him a 'Prisoner of Conscience' making him the first Pakistani to be so honoured for the year 2000.

He was elected co-chairman of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) Media Conference of 100 countries, held in New Delhi in December 1983 and he is the first Pakistani journalist to have a syndicated column in the Indian media, writing regularly in the 'The Times of India' and 'The Hindustan Times.' As Editor of The Muslim, he organised the first Track II dialogue between Pakistan and India in Islamabad in April 1984.

Mushahid Hussain Sayed is the author of three books. He is also chairman of the board of governors of Islamabad Policy Research Institute, a leading think-tank. He is Pakistan's Representative to the 15-member Commission of Eminent Persons formed to reform and restructure the Organisation of Islamic Conference. He is also founder and Chairman of the Pakistan-China Institute, a private, independent think-tank devoted to fostering regional cooperation based on expanding the bilateral bond between the two neighbours.

Mushahid Hussain is also the Vice President of the Centrist Democrat International's Asia-Pacific chapter. On January 27, 2006, he was awarded Congressional Medal of Achievement by the House of Representatives of the Republic of the Philippines.

He has been the Chairman of the Foreign Relations, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas Committee of the Senate in his tenure. He has also been member of the Senate Standing Committee on Defence and Defence Production. He chaired the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Balochistan, whose report was unanimously adopted in 2005.

He has been a guest lecturer at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, the Harvard University, the MIT, the Middle East Institute, the US Institute of Peace, the Stimson Centre, the Oxford University, the Cambridge University and the Georgetown University's Centre for Christian-Muslim Understanding. Since 1978, Mushahid Hussain has been lecturing regularly at leading military training institutions in Pakistan including the National Defence University, the Command & Staff College, the Naval War College, the School of Military Intelligence, as well as the GHQ.

The Pakistan Army

“Pakistan is not only a geographical reality but also a distinctive ideology. The defence of the country is, therefore, a professional as well as religious obligation. The Army and the Nation are together as one.”

Chief of Army Staff,
General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani
Address at GHQ on Martyrs' Day
April 30, 2010

“There are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three.”

Stephen Cohen
Author, “The Idea of Pakistan”

The Pakistan Army is the most pivotal and organized institution of the state, central to its security and stability. Given Pakistan's location in an unstable and volatile neighbourhood, and the nature of its chequered relationship with India - 3 full-scale wars and 4 near-wars - it is no accident that the Pakistan Army has come to enjoy a certain mystique. Four (4) coups reinforce the role of pre-eminence that it currently has. An Islamic ethos propped by Pakistan nationalism give the Army a larger-than-life role. Consequently, this track record has also led to a conflicted relationship between khaki and mufti in Pakistan, often resulting in coups, conflicts and cleavages. Such patterns are not uncommon, even in democracies, particularly in wartime.

Civil-Military Relations and Democracy

In the United States, especially post-9/11, military leaders are treated with reverence.¹ And in India, during the Kargil conflict, the military were portrayed as virtual demi-gods.² Conversely, civil-military relations, even in established democracies, are neither conflict-free nor above suspicion. In his profile of President John F. Kennedy's relations with his generals during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert Dallek writes, “he was livid with the Pentagon,” saying “they haven't any brains.” He added, somewhat sardonically, “these brass hats have one great advantage in their favour. If we listen to them, and do what they want us to do, none of us will be alive later to tell them they were

wrong.”³

Civil-military relations have also been tested under President Obama. After General MacArthur's removal during the Korean War, the first high-profile 4-star general has been sacked during wartime. On June 23, 2010, President Obama dismissed the US military commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, reprimanding his subordinate that his 'conduct represented' in the Rolling Stone article 'does not meet the standard that should be set by a commanding general' and 'it undermines the civilian control of the military that is at the core of our democratic system.' While General MacArthur had differed with his Commander-in-Chief, President Truman on policy, General McChrystal had shown disrespect for his civilian superiors in his interview.

The discomfort in Obama's relations with the powerful Pentagon was evident in his quickly appointing General David Petraeus to succeed General McChrystal, although Obama as Presidential candidate was highly critical of the former's Iraq strategy. The Washington Post, on October 1, 2010, termed the Petraeus appointment as an attempt to defuse a 'potentially larger controversy over Obama's relationship with the military.' And Bob Woodward's latest book 'Obama's Wars' (released on September 27, 2010) presents a portrait of a 'White House team constantly at odds with the military and a President repeatedly frustrated by what he and his advisers saw as the military's effort to thwart him.'⁴ And in a reference to the American Establishment, the noted author and film-maker, Michael Moore, titled his review of the Woodward book: 'Woodward book reveals that civilian control of the military is a joke.' Moore criticises President Obama 'because he's not willing to stand up to the people who actually run the country,' adding 'it matters not whom we elect, the Pentagon and the military contractors call the shots.'⁵

According to 'The Dynasty the Nehru-Gandhi Story' by Jay Adams and Philip Whitehead, Mrs. Gandhi, 'in her isolation and paranoia, was convinced that a military coup was imminent.' She even summoned the Chief of Army Staff, General Sam Maneckshaw, to her office to discuss this rumour.⁶ And Ravi Rikhye writes in 'The Militarization of Mother India,' that 'in only one case in the 1950s did India ever buy less than Pakistan in response to Pakistan's first purchase of 450 Patton tanks.' Significantly, says the author, 'this was clearly a political decision because Nehru did not want the army to gain too much power.'⁷

Civilian control of the military can be tenuous even in

established democracies, especially under young, inexperienced leaders. While Obama, like Kennedy, is trying to enforce a semblance of civilian supremacy over his military, in neighbouring India, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi too had his 'teething troubles' with the Indian military. According to Professor Stephen Cohen, author of books on the Pakistan and Indian Armies, unbeknown to Rajiv, the 1987 Exercise Brasstacks was going to be converted into Operation Brasstacks against Pakistan by his trigger-happy Army Chief, General Sundarji. But when the Prime Minister got wind of this plan that his generals were leading to a war not of his choice, he quickly backed off and reined in Sundarji.⁸ The Indian military establishment has intervened on occasion to stall or thwart a policy initiative that it views as being detrimental to India's security interests, notwithstanding the civilian government's perspective to the contrary. Siachen being one such example, where the then Indian Army Chief, General J.J. Singh, 'did his best to torpedo an agreement with Pakistan.'⁹

India and Pakistan: the Un-shared History

From the very beginning of the 2 states Pakistan and India civil-military relations took on a divergent direction because of crucial decisions in both countries early on that set certain "rules of the game." In 1948, when the Indian Army's British General Roy Bucher, expressed some reluctance to move into Hyderabad, Home Minister Patel told him that if he opposed the Hyderabad action, he was free to resign. The General chose to comply.¹⁰

Conversely, in Pakistan, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Douglas Gracey, chose to defy the government when he was asked to send the Army into Kashmir.¹¹ This contrast in the civil-military tradition created a legacy that was reinforced over the decades.

While analyzing civil-military relations, it is important to understand the context in which the Army has functioned as the mainstay of the power structure, or which is termed in popular parlance as the 'Establishment.' Like any other country, Pakistan's Establishment is woven together by institutional linkages and common interests, outlook and worldview. Apart from the Army, the Establishment has found partners in Intelligence, the civil service hierarchy, the higher judiciary, powerful politicians, big feudals, business tycoons, and media barons.

The Establishment normally exudes a somewhat,

monolithic approach in what it sees as the promotion and protection of the 'national interest.' Since its interests are institutional and national, not individual, on at least three occasions in Pakistan's history, the Establishment has split due to upheavals on the ground. In 1971, when the second military regime was removed by the military brass itself to pave the way for restoration of democracy under an elected, civilian government following the secession of Bangladesh. In 1993, when political conflict between the President and the Prime Minister threatened to split the system at its seams, the Establishment discarded its 'godfather,' Ghulam Ishaq Khan, to engineer a political change via a 'soft coup.' And in 2007-2008, the higher Judiciary broke with the Establishment for the first time in Pakistan's history.

Military rulers represented the interests and objectives of the Establishment when the Army ran the country. However, at different times of Pakistan's chequered past, civilians too have been at the head of the Establishment. These powerful civilians have included Governor General Ghulam Muhammed, President Iskandar Mirza, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who also was the first and only civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator, and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

Currently, Pakistan presents a unique phase of its political transition, when the 'Old Establishment' is no more, with the emergence of new power players, who influence the national discourse, and, hence, decision-making. Today, no single institution or individual is fully in-charge of Pakistan, or can call the shots on their own. Rather, the military-security establishment (represented by the Army and Intelligence), the political establishment (represented by the Parliament, the federal and provincial Governments), an autonomous Judiciary, an independent and free media, and a vibrant civil society, are separately influential in shaping perceptions and policy.

Myths about Military's Role

When it comes to civil-military relations in Pakistan, there are 3 myths that are often peddled about the military as if these are primary reasons for the military's continued preponderance in the Pakistan polity.

Dividing Politicians

The first myth is that the Army is always deliberately keen to divide politicians and create cleavages amongst them. However, this is contrary to the facts as the following track record of the military's role as a referee of sorts between

warring political factions will show:

- Gen. Beg in 1990: PPP and MQM exchange prisoners in Karachi Corps Commander's Office.
- Gen. Kakar in 1993: Tried to mediate between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and in May-June 1994, between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.
- Gen. Karamat in 1997: Rushed back from London to broker a 'ceasefire' between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Justice Sajjad Ali Shah.
- Gen. Kayani on March 15, 2009: Mediated to end 'Long March' between President Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif and helped restore Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

Waiting in the Wings

The second myth is that the Army is always keen, wanting and ready to intervene to capture civilian space, especially in the domain of policymaking. This too is not borne out by facts. In 1973, it was Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who injected the Army into counter insurgency operations in Balochistan after dismissing the elected government of that province, followed by banning the opposition National Awami Party (NAP) and arresting the Leader of the Opposition. In 1989, Benazir Bhutto gave control of the Afghan Policy to the General Head Quarters (GHQ) under General Beg. And in her second tenure, in 1994, she, through her Interior Minister, Nasirullah Babar, encouraged the formation of the Taliban in continuation of her father's Afghan Policy of 1974, where again the principal player was then Maj. Gen. Nasirullah Babar as the Inspector General of Frontier Corps (IGFC).

In 1998, after Pakistan had become a nuclear power, it was Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who handed over control of all matters nuclear to Army Chief, General Parvez Musharraf, much to Dr. A. Q. Khan's chagrin. It is no accident that General Kidwai, who was appointed shortly afterwards, is one person who continues till today in the same slot in the management of the nuclear programme.¹² And it was none other than Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who brought in the Army in such areas of governance as running the WAPDA, holding the census and monitoring ghost schools in the education sector.

Rough Relations with India

The third myth about the Pakistan Army is that it does not seek a solution of the Kashmir issue as it would weaken its own position as protector of Pakistan's security. This again is not borne out by facts. In fact, most military rulers have

had a pragmatic position on relations with Indian, at times "softer than their civilian counterparts." For instance, Pakistan's first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan offered a "joint defence" of the sub-continent to India against the "threat from the North" soon after taking over in 1959. For the most part, General Zia maintained a studied silence on the Kashmir issue, focusing his energies on Afghanistan. For his part, General Parvez Musharraf was willing and ready to go the extra mile in flexibility on Kashmir for a durable deal with India. In fact, the civilian successors to the Musharraf regime have criticized him for his Kashmir policy.¹³

Military's Role in Pakistan's Polity

However, the Army's preponderant role in Pakistan's polity is due to several other factors. First, there is the failure of politicians to fashion 'rules of the game' among themselves, and their continuing inability to present a 'united front' before the military. At the first available opportunity, the military is 'invited' to intervene, or a military coup is welcomed as an easy option to remove rivals.

Second, since the last 60 years, despite turns and twists, Pakistan's American connection is perceived as pivotal for Pakistan's stability, security and economy by both the military and civilian politicians, and the mainstay of this relationship is the tie between the Pentagon and the GHQ. When the chips are down, there is invariably greater reliance and confidence from the United States on the Pakistani Military, than Pakistan's elected elite. Geopolitics helped strengthen this Pentagon-GHQ bonding, from the Cold War in the 1950s, the opening to China, the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s or the 'war on terror' post 9/11.

Third, other than Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, no elected leader has seriously focused to work out an institutional mechanism for civil-military relations. The politician's proclivity is to pick a person as 'my man' to run the Army or the ISI, an approach that is both naïve and short-sighted since it does not take cognisance of how the military functions as an institution since such loyalties can never be personalised.

Finally, the Army's mystique and self-image as a 'unique, professional outfit different and superior to civilians' also fuels fear and suspicion among its nominal civilian bosses, who normally ending up treating the Army as a 'Holy Cow' not even to be touched by a pair of tongs, crude attempts at 'control' notwithstanding. For instance, there has never been a 'real' Defence Minister in Pakistan's history, this slot is always an ornamental designation without actual

authority.

Beyond the Conventional

The Pakistan Army is amongst those few armies that view its own role beyond the conventional and constitutional stipulations of defending the country from external aggression. Like the armies of China, Turkey and Indonesia, the Pakistan Army views its own role as the institutional and ideological mainstay of the Pakistani state. It is, at the same time, 'defender of the faith' (ideological moorings based on Islam), 'guardian of the family silver' (nuclear and missile programme) and a deterrent against external enemies. So the role of security is reinforced by stability and this role is something that the Peoples Liberation Army of China, the Indonesian or the Turkish Armed Forces also see themselves playing. In fact, the Indonesians have institutionalized a 'dual function role.' This role is viewed by these armies as 'legitimate' extension of their professional role as well as being of key importance for the fate of the nation.¹⁴

Parliamentary Oversight of Defence

In the today's environment of civil-military relations, the conditions are conducive for Parliamentary Committees to engage in oversight of the security sector. There is, for instance, a broad national consensus between the khaki and the mufti regarding respective roles of different institutions. A strident media and an activist judiciary have contributed to create a democratic political culture where there is little room for a military role in politics or in governance. Given the consensus achieved in Parliament in areas such as Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, the National Finance Commission Award, Balochistan and the campaign against terrorism and extremism, the time is right for Parliamentary oversight of the security sector.

Little Tradition of Parliamentary Oversight

However, Pakistan has little tradition of institutional Parliamentary oversight of the security sector, rather the focus has been on individual control or bureaucratic oversight through powerful and competent civil servants. For instance, powerful Finance Ministers like Mohammad Shoab in the days of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Ghulam Ishaq Khan under General Zia often overruled the military on budgetary issues. In 1975, when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto launched the secret Kahuta Project, he appointed a 3-man committee of senior civilian bureaucrats to

oversee the nuclear programme. These 3 were Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Agha Shahi and A.G.N. Kazi.

History of Parliamentary Oversight

Pakistan's political history has witnessed two instances where a semblance of institutional Parliamentary oversight was begun. Prime Minister Junejo made Parliament the pivot of his authority, regularly presiding over parliamentary meetings and attending parliamentary sessions. He authorized the Public Accounts Committee to look into defence projects and he extended the austerity programme of his government to include the Generals by ensuring that all senior officials, both in mufti and khaki, would ride in Suzukis rather than big limousines.

In April 1988, he also became the first Prime Minister to return a recommendation for military promotion from the GHQ asking for another file and only after he was satisfied, with the induction of a new name, then he agreed to the promotion of a 3-Star General. After the Ojhri ammunition dump explosion in 1988, he instituted a high level inquiry. And under his watch, in 1985, during a debate on the Eighth Amendment which lingered on over several months, General Zia was forced to retract on his proposal of a National Security Council because of opposition in the non-party Parliament. It was also another first under Prime Minister Junejo that the Director General Inter Services Intelligence (DG ISI) Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul was called in for an in-camera briefing before the Parliament.¹⁵

Prospects of Parliamentary Oversight

Almost a quarter of a century later, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani too has taken some modest steps to institutionalize parliamentary oversight over the security sector. Within a week of taking over on April 3, 2008, he convened a high level briefing by the Chief of Army Staff for all the top political leaders. Then he also established a Parliamentary Committee on National Security which received, like the tenure of Mr. Junejo, briefings by the DG, ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

Before launching the Swat-Malakand operation by the Pakistan Army, Prime Minister Gilani convened an All-Parties Conference in April 2009 which concurred by consensus on the need to combat the internal security threat in that region. He also, for the first time in Pakistan's history, empowered the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)

by making the Leader of the Opposition as its Chairman. To its credit, the PAC under the Opposition Leader has been more effective than all its predecessors by enlarging civilian space, bringing the khakis also in its domain of financial accountability and holding hearings on issues pertaining to military expenditure as well. And in the context of the Benazir Bhutto Murder Case, there was another first when a serving Major General was asked to appear before a civilian-led inquiry committee.

Lack of Parliamentary Oversight

There were reasons why Parliaments in general and Parliamentary Committee on Defence have not been able to oversee the security sector. Combination of a lack of political will, fear of the khakis, incompetence and resistance by the security sector resulted in limited oversight. However, it is not specific to Pakistan. Even in a strong democracy like India, “the effectiveness of parliamentary control has been somewhat constrained due to concern for secrecy in matters of national security.” And another factor limiting the efficiency of parliamentary oversight is the “lack of expertise among politicians and civil servants.”¹⁶

Parliamentary Rules

In regards the Constitution, laws and Rules of Procedures, the Parliamentary committees are fully empowered to oversee the security sector through the Ministry of Defence. There is an identical rule 182(1) in the National Assembly Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business 1992 (The NA Rules). Both Senate Rule 146 and NA Rule 182 also have identical clauses (2) and (3). However, NA Rule 182 also has clause (4) which reads as under:

“A committee may examine the expenditures, administration, delegated legislation, public petitions and policies of the ministry concerned and its associated public bodies and may forward its report of findings and recommendations to the ministry and the ministry shall submit its reply to the committee.”

Constraints to Oversight

The constraints, if any, are political, professional and psychological not legal or constitutional. The requisite rules and powers extend to oversee accountability of the

security sector, although certain existing institutional mechanisms need to be beefed up in this regard. The biggest problem facing parliamentary oversight on defence in Pakistan is the absence of capacity in terms of skills, staff and support facilities. Here the rules do need to be changed because committees have a bare minimum of staffing and there is no provision in the rules for professional, research staff.

Institutional Support

It is time that Parliamentary Committees especially on Defence and Foreign Affairs be provided with institutional support. The best way would be that the Foreign Office-funded, Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) should be attached to the Parliament and be made responsible to the Parliamentary Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs to provide backup support in terms of research, policy papers, special studies, etc. Currently, it has no role in policy making. This would go a long way in providing Pakistan's parliamentary committees with the requisite information, data and research support to oversee the security sector.

In this regard, it is not just the Parliamentary Committees on Defence of the National Assembly and the Senate but the Foreign Affairs Committee too that have a role because there is often an overlap between defence and foreign affairs.

In terms of the democratic oversight of the military and its economic interests, the Public Accounts Committee should be the right body for that. What is needed from the military side regarding its commercial institutions is transparency, and that they are treated at par with other similar commercial institutions of the state of Pakistan, conforming to their laws, rules and regulations. It would immensely help parliamentary oversight of such military-run commercial institutions if the Parliament were to enact strong, conflict-of-interest legislation that would apply equally to politicians, Generals, bureaucrats and other sectors of society. There cannot be one standard for the civilians and another for the khaki. Both should be subordinate to the rule of law. Scrutiny of major defence deals by the Public Accounts Committee would help otherwise, in the current context, the Supreme Court is another forum whose suo moto actions are helping in promoting both accountability and transparency in the financial dealings of state institutions.

Model for Pakistan

In the context of Pakistan, which is making a successful transition to democracy after military rule, it is hard to seek or apply a “model” on parliamentary oversight of the security sector, including Intelligence.¹⁷ Specific conditions and ground realities often determine the best way forward. The key would be to build trust and confidence through a gradualist approach that seeks more space for the supremacy of Parliament.¹⁸ The important change is the military's willingness to part with its Praetorian past by accepting civilian authority (as demonstrated in the last 2 years) and a national consensus within Pakistani society for strengthening the civilian democratic dispensation.

A good starting point to strengthen this process would be to establish certain “rules of the game” among the political forces where contentious issues are resolved in Parliament through consultation and consensus and there is no recourse to a ‘referee’ from the outside. The other point is for the incumbent government not to use the security sector - army and intelligence agencies - for their political purposes whether it is the issue of wire-tapping of political opponents or the failure to provide effective and efficient civilian governance in areas already secured and held by the army after a military operation (Swat-Malakand and FATA). Such instances invariably lead to governmental reliance on non-political factors which, in turn, weakens democratic space.

Capacity and Will

Today, the initiative is in the hands of politicians to provide Pakistan with a new direction as far as civil-military relations go. If they muster up the will and the capability for parliamentary oversight of the security sector, then this is doable in today's Pakistan.

Even under the previous military-dominated dispensation, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs initiated, for the first time in Pakistan's history, a briefing on the nuclear programme on July 7, 2006, which was conducted personally for over 3 hours by Lt. Gen. Kidwai, with the Defence Committees in attendance. And in February 2005, in another first, there was a briefing on the defence policy of Pakistan by the Secretary Defence to the Defence Committee, as well as in camera briefing for Committee members on the defence budget. In a December 16, 2005, meeting, the majority of the Defence Committee even opposed the purchase of VVIP planes for the President and

Prime Minister, on grounds of post-earthquake austerity, although this decision was subsequently reversed under pressure.

It depends on the capacity of Parliamentarians whether they will remain fearful in their minds regarding “Holy Cows” or they fulfil their Parliamentary mandate through a rigorous oversight which requires both hard work and home work, qualities that are still found wanting.

Understanding Corporate Interests of the Armed Forces

In this context, for starters, it would help parliamentarians if they were to understand the “corporate interests” of the Armed forces and at the same time help redefine the notion of ‘national security.’ The Armed Forces’ ‘corporate interests’ at their core can be listed as follows:

- No tinkering with the chain of command.
- Respect writ of services chiefs over their respective force, especially operational autonomy.
- No interference in their promotions, transfers and procedure of appointments within their respective force.
- Military equipment, training and modernization according to their service vision.
- Budget which meets their fundamental needs (pays, perks, privileges, weaponry, training, etc).
- Welfare of ex-servicemen, particularly housing, employment and medical facilities.
- Autonomy in “Cantonment culture” which is an insular life of its own (unit, club, mess, school, hospital).
- No counter armed force to compete with them (police, para-military, FSF).
- Morale of officers and soldiers and their respect in society, particularly protocol for senior officers at state functions.
- No involvement of foreigners in their domain.
- Image of professionalism, competence, discipline and merit-based promotion.
- Pride in heritage and history (unit & corps camaraderie, performance in battles, etc.)
- No injection of ethnic, linguistic, class, sectarian or political prejudices within the Armed Forces' rank and file.
- Close nexus with the nation above party-governmental lines.

What lessons from the past can be a useful guide to the future, in terms of Do's and Don'ts:

Don'ts

- Avoid witch-hunt or blame game in case of crisis or conflict.
- Avoid trying to 'capture' or 'control' ISI or GHQ (it never works!)
- Avoid propensity to appoint, pick and choose, 'My Man' for Chief of Army Staff (COAS) once COAS, he's nobody's man. Prime Ministers Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan learnt that, to their lasting regret. Professionalism should be paramount.
- Avoid public humiliation of khaki a la Gen. Gul Hasan, Gen. Karamat. Civilian supremacy does not necessarily mean khaki subjugation.
- Do not tinker with the Army's established chain of command.
- Do not tap COAS phones via the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and avoid 'spy vs spy wars.'
- Do not complain about your military commanders or top intelligence chiefs to any foreign entity.
- Avoid major decisions in informal sittings.
- Avoid amateurish attempts to 'control' the ISI (by appointing civilian, or from non-combat corps (Engineers, eg) or on clan considerations, or Rehman Malik's 'Notification' fiasco in July 2008.
- Do not base decisions regarding military chiefs on the basis of gossip, rumour, conspiracy theories or intelligence reports.

Do's

- Have a good Defence Secretary, who enjoys confidence of COAS to serve as 'buffer' between Pindi and Islamabad.
- Seek institutional solutions to issues via parliamentary committees or an institutionalized consultative process.
- Have same standards for Khaki which you have for civilians.
- Conflict of interest legislation should be applicable to both.
- Have an institutionalized system of decision-making with minutes of meetings and records of who said what (1965 Operation Gibraltar and 1999 Kargil have no such record).
- Have regular interaction with services chiefs individually, and play it straight with them in an upfront manner as khaki culture is not normally devious.

- Do request military briefings to the Parliament on national security. Khakis love to give power-point presentations.
- Picking military leaders, just do it the right way professionalism, competence and seniority matter, not sycophancy or ethnicity or other considerations of 'loyalty.'
- Do away with practice of Military Secretary to Prime Minister they invariably end up as political advisers to the PM, especially on military matters, as happened so often in the past (especially under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif). Their advice is often based on personal proclivities, thereby widening khaki-mufti gulf. In any case, such pomp and ceremony is more befitting a colonial era.

Recommendations for Defence and National Security

1. Redefine notion of 'National Security' to include civilian components as well. For too long, National Security has been defined primarily in terms of military might e.g. standing army, missiles, tanks, atom bombs, etc. In today's world, a country's security is provided by such key civilian elements as political parties (uniting the federation), Constitution, Parliament, Media, Judiciary, Education, Economy and Energy, Rule of Law and Human Rights, Provincial Autonomy, and Environment/Climate Change.
2. The Office of National Security Advisor (NSA) to the Prime Minister should be restored, and the NSA be tasked with coordination between the Ministries of Defence & Foreign Affairs, and the Parliament. The Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) should serve as the think-tank of the National Security Advisor's office in the PM Secretariat.
3. Strengthen Ministry of Defence (MOD) in terms of capacity and role. It should be headed by a Secretary General and also have an Office of Parliamentary Liaison, headed by a 2-star general, to coordinate with parliament.
4. Every two years, a National Security Strategy based on inter-service input plus that of Intelligence and the Parliamentary Committee on National Security should be put together under the auspices of the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. The report should be prepared and coordinated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and presented to Parliament via the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor. This National Security Strategy should include:
 - Nature and source of threats, both external and internal.
 - Steps taken or envisaged to meet those threats.
 - Acquisition of equipment via defence deals and how these will strengthen security.
 - Production of defence equipment at home.
 - Non-military threats like sectarian, ethnic or other fault-lines.
 - Interface of Media, Defence and Diplomacy and threats like anti-Pakistan propaganda.

- Energy, Environment, Climate Change and Human Security.

The Parliament should debate the National Security Strategy and propose changes and policy recommendations for the Government to follow and implement.

5. At his speech to the Command & Staff College, Quetta on June 14, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam urged the military officers to "study the Constitution in Pakistan and understand its true constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faithful to the Constitution." The Constitution should be compulsory reading as part of curriculum of the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) in Kakul, Command & Staff College, Quetta and National Defence University, Islamabad.
6. The Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) should be made permanent as it straddles the divide between defence, foreign affairs and intelligence. The PCNS should be provided with regular briefings by military leaders as well as intelligence chiefs on all relevant issues. The PCNS should be entrusted with formulating a do-able Counter-Terrorism Strategy, taking input from federal and provincial governments plus the Armed Forces and the Intelligence. From the government, the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor should coordinate in formulation and implementation of this strategy. Currently, the absence of such an effective Counter-Terrorism Strategy has transferred the initiative in the hands of terrorists, who are able to strike at a time and target of their choosing.
7. Strengthen Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) with its own small, lean secretariat and with monthly meetings presided over by the Prime Minister.
8. Parliamentary oversight should be responsibility of the Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs as well as the Public Accounts Committee. They should be professionally staffed, backed by a think-tank such as the Institute of Strategic Studies.
9. The MOD, the DCC and the Joint Staff Headquarters should develop close coordination in terms of

policy inputs and strategic thinking which will be invaluable for the parliament as well as the nation. That coordination is only possible if the government through Parliament takes a pro-active interest on issues.

10. Government should avoid trying to reinvent the wheel and not seek to establish new institutions that end up being white elephants like the National Security Council in the past.
11. During military regimes, Service Chiefs, doubling as dictators, have been accused of acting as 'virtual warlords', master of their domain, with unchecked and unfettered power often abused in the past by tapping telephones of rival serving 4-star colleagues. They are also alleged to have taken fundamental policy decisions without consultation of their colleagues. Some examples:
 - General K. M. Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff, was put under surveillance by General Zia in 1986-1987.
 - General Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff, was wire-tapped by his nominated successor, General Asif Nawaz, during May-August 1991.
 - General Aziz Khan and General Ehsanul Haq, both were Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and they were wire-tapped by General Musharraf, although they were ostensibly his close confidants.
 - Additionally, such a powerful and important institution should not act as a virtual one-man show changing personnel and policy according to personal whims. For instance, most of General Musharraf's military colleagues have disassociated from his back-channel Kashmir policy, which means absence of institutional input and support for such a policy. And the fateful decisions to send the 'Gibraltar Force' into Kashmir in July 1965, which later led to the September 1965 War, and the 1999 Kargil incursion, both were taken without discussion or consultation with the Corps Commanders.

Recommendations for Intelligence Reform

1. The Government should instruct all intelligence organizations to stop wire-tapping of politicians, journalists, judges and other public figures unless there is evidence of any one of them as a possible 'security threat.' There should be an internal mechanism requiring written clearance from the Prime Minister for such actions, failing which politically-motivated wire-tapping be declared illegal by the Supreme Court, and the perpetrators punished.
2. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights be made compulsory in the curriculum of all institutions training intelligence officers and personnel, so that there is sensitivity to human rights of citizens and violations of their rights cease.
3. Due to the absence of intelligence coordination, there is need for a Joint Intelligence Training Academy where all new comers, both civilian and military, can be professionally trained together. Additionally, to ensure a cooperative culture of coordination within the world of Intelligence, like the Foreign Service and the Civil Service, there should be a National Intelligence Service, where recruitment should be open to those who qualify through a strict merit-based process.
4. Instead of duplicating work of the ISI or competing with it, the Intelligence Bureau should be de-linked from domestic politics and dedicated to Counter-Terrorism, implementing the Counter-Terror Strategy. Additionally, the Special Branch in the provinces should work as its provincial 'eyes and ears' in a full time, dedicated manner to meet this new urgent threat to our security.
5. The rule of law and civilized norms must prevail in the world of Intelligence. Hence, there is no room for missing persons, kidnapping, torture or beating of persons, as is often alleged in the media. Necessary guidelines need to be prepared by the PCNS, with a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) laid down in this regard, which should strictly conform to the law of the land.

Conclusion

In Pakistan's chequered political history, there have been 3 different kinds of military interventions. Outright military coup on four occasions. While the 1958 and 1969 coups were planned well in advance, the other two coups, in 1977 and 1999, were avoidable, and certainly not inevitable. Had the political leadership taken the right, timely decisions, these two coups could have been averted.

Then, a 'soft coup' in 1993 removed both top civilian holders from office and brought about a change through elections, similar to the one in 1997 in Turkey. In 1997 and 2009, there were "democratic, positive" interventions by the Army Chief to stabilize the system by acting as a 'referee' in domestic political conflict, in both case involving judicial crises.

While chances of a military coup are virtually non-existent, governance in the country and the manner of polarization, amongst the political forces, and between the executive and the Judiciary, the gravity of the economic crisis, social instability in the floods aftermath, and any destabilisation due to escalation of the US/NATO Afghan war, will determine the future course of civil-military relations. Should any of these factors aggravate, the Army could be sucked in to play a behind-the-scenes constitutional 'course correction' role.

For the foreseeable future, the military's strong institutional role is likely to continue because of the geo-political realities, particularly the war in Afghanistan, the situation vis-à-vis India and the fact that even the international community seems to have faith in the Armed Forces as the provider of Pakistan's security and in the ultimate analysis, a source of stability for the world's only Muslim nuclear power.

Additionally, in the context of the flood crisis, the Army has played a leading, proactive role in support of the Government. The military high command is also well aware that its high rating today is mainly due to its performance as a professional, apolitical institution, whether it is combating terrorism or helping in flood relief. In other words, under a new Chief, the Army has started with a clean slate, restoring its pride and professionalism, and off-loading the baggage of the past.

However, parliamentary oversight of the security sector can be harmoniously blended with the support and

cooperation both of the elected government and the Armed Forces, a process that is slowly but surely underway.

Despite coups and transgressions from the law, thanks to the British tradition, Pakistan is a state whose system is now increasingly anchored within the framework of the rule of law, where legitimacy and laws matter, thanks also to an independent Supreme Court.

Even khaki rulers were forced to undergo 'quasi-civilianization of military rule,' to legitimize their authority.¹⁹ The key change is that the civilian sector Parliament, political forces, media, Judiciary and civil society now holds sway, setting the national agenda and dominating the discourse, a reality that the Armed Forces are comfortably coexisting with.

FACT SHEET ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN

- 1947:** Army Commander in Chief, General Gracey defies Quaid on sending troops to Kashmir.
- 1951:** Pindi Conspiracy Case first attempt by disgruntled Army officers to overthrow elected government.
- 1951:** Commander in Chief Army Gen. Ayub Khan instructs his Defence Attaché in Washington, Brig. Mian Ghulam Jilani, to bypass civilian change of command and report directly to him because “these civilians can’t be trusted with sensitive national security.”
- 1953:** Mini Martial Law in Lahore after riots.
- 1954:** Gen. Ayub Khan, as serving C-in-C, joins Cabinet as Defence Minister.
- 1958:** First Martial Law imposed. Gen. Ayub Khan has a high-profile US visit in March coup comes 6 months later.
- 1965:** 'Operation Gibraltar' is conceived in the cool confines of Murree's 12 Division Officer's Mess with a select few privy to the plan.
- Sept. 13, 1965:** A story by Victor Anant in London's daily Telegraph reports that the United States tried to 'foment a coup d'eta't against President Ayub, but it proved abortive as the presumed replacement, Lt Gen (Redtd.) Azam Khan, refused to play ball.'
- 1968:** On visit to China, a tipsy C-in-C Gen. Yahya Khan, confidently tells The Telegraph's Clare Hollingsworth, in response to who might replace ailing Ayub as President: 'I will.'
- 1969:** President Ayub violates his own Constitution by resigning and handing over to Gen. Yahya after GHQ high command conveys to him that “the old man has to go.”
- 1970:** Soon after polls, Zulfikar Bhutto says '3 political forces in Pakistan Army, PPP and Awami League.'
- 1971:** After general elections that brings majority for Sheikh Mujib, his talks with Gen. Yahya Khan fail as Yahya refuses to become 'The Queen Elizabeth of Pakistan,' a toothless President to a strong Prime Minister a la Westminster-style parliamentary system.
- Dec. 19, 1971:** Angry Army officers at the GHQ shout down Yahya crony and his number two, General Abdul Hamid, after December 16 surrender at Dacca, implying Yahya's plan to perpetuate himself in power under a new Constitution is not acceptable.
- Dec. 20, 1971:** Special PIA plane is sent to Rome to fetch Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by the new power duo, Army Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan, and Air Force Commander in Chief Air Marshal Rahim Khan. Bhutto is sworn in as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator and 7

top Generals are summarily removed from service and retired.

- April 1972:** Furore in the Army after Pakistan Television screens movie of military surrender at Dacca.
- 1972:** Bhutto appoints Commission of Inquiry under Chief Justice Hamoodur Rehman on 1971 Debacle.
- March 1973:** Disgruntled, mostly young, bright officers of the Army are arrested for hatching a conspiracy to overthrow elected government.
- 1973:** New Constitution: Bhutto proclaims 'Martial Law buried forever.'
- 1974-1975:** Attock Conspiracy case, presided over by Maj. Gen. Ziaul Haq, passes stiff sentences to the accused.
- 1975:** Bhutto invites in Afghan dissidents: Hekmatyar, Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masood, to counter President Daud Khan's 'Pakhtunistan' stunt. Only two others are privy to Bhutto's 'forward' Afghan policy: COAS General Tikka Khan & IGFC Major General Nasirullah Babar.
- 1976:** Bhutto announces Higher Defence Organization with a new slot of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, while C-in-C designation dropped in favour of Chief of Staff, whose tenure of office is slashed by a year.
- 1975:** Bhutto instructs the ISI to start dabbling in domestic politics with formation of a 'Political Cell.' But he is livid over discovery of bugs in his official residential telephone.
- 1975:** Bhutto launches top secret Kahuta Project with Army responsible for its construction and security while Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Agha Shahi and A.G.N. Kazi will oversee N-Bomb project.
- 1976:** Bhutto supercedes 6 generals to appoint Chief of Army Staff General Ziaul Haq, who immediately gives a new motto for the Army: Iman, Taqwa, Jihad (Faith, Piety and Righteous struggle).
- 1977:** After advice of the ISI and the IB, Prime Minister Bhutto announces General Election for March, on his own assumption and their assurance that Opposition, in disarray, will never unite. Opposition unites a week later, and announces 9-party Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).
- March 1977:** Election rigging sparks nationwide agitation led by PNA.
- April 26, 1977:** Services Chiefs, in public statement, pledge loyalty to Bhutto.
- May 1977:** Mini-Martial Law in strife-torn Lahore, Hyderabad and Karachi. 3 out of 4 Brigadiers in Lahore resign, protesting their inability to fire on unarmed demonstrators.
- June 1977:** Bhutto involves Corps Commanders and foreign friends in negotiations with PNA. Tells

Chief of Army Staff General Zia that he wants to “amend Constitution to determine role of Army in affairs of government.”

- July 5, 1977:** Martial Law imposed. Gen. Zia acclaims Islamic spirit of PNA protestors in maiden speech as shocked PPP activists initially think Martial Law is Bhutto ploy to defuse agitation, since Gen. Zia is 'Bhutto's man.'
- August 8, 1977:** After popular welcome to sacked Prime Minister Bhutto in Lahore, where he announces 'there is no difference between PNA and PMA (Pakistan Military Academy),' Zia decides to arrest Bhutto and revive old murder case.
- September 1977:** Bhutto murder trial begins, and in October, promise of polls after 90 days is shelved.
- March 1979:** Bhutto trial lingers on for 18 months with split Supreme Court, 4-3, verdict against him.
- April 1979:** Bhutto is hanged.
- July 1979:** Joint CIA-ISI covert operation against pro-Soviet Kabul regime launched.
- 1980:** Maj. Gen. Tajammal Hussain is arrested for allegedly sowing dissension in Army.
- 1981:** Bypassing Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, who talks of 'non-alignment,' military brass conducts negotiations with US for new aid package, even offering bases.
- 1982:** Agha Shahi resigns, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Yaqub Khan is new Foreign Minister.
- 1983:** Military regime has discreet dialogue with Wali Khan and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.
- September 1983:** At the height of MRD agitation, visiting US Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger tells American journalists: “in this situation, we have to look at alternatives.”
- 1984:** Army announces arrests in 'India-based plot' involving civilians and junior officers.
- 1985:** Non-party polls with MRD boycott. Gen. Zia appoints Muhammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister.
- 1985:** Soon after his induction, Prime Minister Junejo says “Democracy and Martial law cannot co-exist' and sacks powerful Zia confidante, Information Secretary Lt. Gen. Mujibur Rehman.
- 1985:** Eighth Constitutional Amendment is passed but Gen. Zia is forced to retract on the National Security Council.
- July 1986:** After high-profile US official visit where Prime Minister Junejo is feted by President Reagan, US starts some distancing from Gen. Zia. Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Army Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. K. M. Arif move closer to Prime Minister Junejo, agreeing with him that Gen. Zia should 'shed uniform.'

- April 1986:** Prime Minister Junejo over-rules Gen. Zia by allowing Benazir Bhutto a free hand on her return.
- 1987:** Prime Minister Junejo announces austerity move, orders Generals to use Suzukis rather than big cars.
- 1987:** Gen. Zia starts consultations with Intellectuals and Editors on “what is Pakistan's problem number one” at Aiwan-e-Sadr.
- 1987:** Public Accounts Committee critically examines defence spending.
- February 1988:** Prime Minister Junejo, in defiance of Gen. Zia, holds Roundtable Conference on Afghanistan and achieves political consensus on signing of Geneva Accord.
- March 1988:** As date for signing nears, Zia-Junejo differences widen, and a furious Gen. Zia tells Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani, “people will lynch you if you sign the Geneva Accord.”
- April 10, 1988:** Ojhri ammunition depot, laden with arms for Afghan Jihad, is blasted in suspected sabotage. Prime Minister Junejo announces high-level inquiry as to why ammunition stored at such a public place in the heart of Rawalpindi.
- May 22, 1988:** Gen. Zia warns civilian government: “Don't be our prosecutors, be our patrons.”
- May 29, 1988:** A cornered, friendless Gen. Zia sacks Prime Minister Junejo and the Parliament.
- August 17, 1988:** Gen. Zia-ul-Haq is killed in mysterious plane crash.
- November 1988:** New elections: ISI cobbles 8-party coalition, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), to counter Benazir Bhutto's party in the wake of 'vacuum' of Gen. Zia's death.
- December 1988:** Benazir Bhutto wins polls but she has to accept US-brokered deal with the Establishment, whereby, Afghan policy is off-limits, Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan is to remain Foreign Minister, Army domain is 'no go area' and she has to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan for President.
- March 1989:** Visiting PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, warns Benazir Bhutto: 'watch out for two generals General Hamid Gul, because he's too ambitious, and General Babar, because he's too naïve.'
- March 1989:** Jalalabad operation fails, weakening the ISI clout.
- June 1989:** Director General ISI, General Hamid Gul removed. The ISI has first civilian head, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S. R. Kallue. COAS General Aslam Beg beefs up Military Intelligence, as ISI is no longer under GHQ clout.

- July 1989:** Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto tries to remove Admiral Sirohey as Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee but fails.
- September 1989:** Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto hands over Afghan policy directly to the GHQ under Gen. Beg.
- October 1989:** Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto barely survives no-confidence move, which has covert backing of the establishment.
- January 1990:** Soon after Kashmir uprising erupts, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's dovish message sent to India via her Special Envoy, Happy Minwala, is over-ruled by a subsequent firmer line from Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan.
- April 1990:** In Prime Minister Benazir's absence, US sends a special envoy, CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates, to Pakistan to defuse tensions with India.
- July 1990:** Prime Minister Benazir calls President Bush from Ambassador Oakley's residence, seeking his help in alleged plot to oust her.
- August 6, 1990:** Prime Minister Benazir sacked by the President, and Parliament dissolved.
- November 1990:** The ISI/MI distribute Mehran Bank funds of Rs.140 million to selected politicians and journalists on the eve of elections.
- January 1991:** Chief of Army Staff Gen. Beg publicly dissents from government policy on Gulf War. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif urges President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to sack him but he refuses.
- May 1991:** Gen. Beg's successor is announced three months early to pre-empt any move by him. He is also put under surveillance, despite being COAS.
- January 1992:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appoints Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, from Corps of Engineers, as DG ISI, despite opposition by Chief of Army Staff General Asif Nawaz.
- June 1992:** Army launches anti-dacoit operation in rural Sindh, naming Defence Minister Ghaus Ali Shah as "patharidar" (protector of dacoits), and anti-MQM operation in urban Sindh. Establishment creates MQM-Haqiqi, which Gen. Asif justifies in BBC interview: "If PML can have two factions, why not MQM."
- October 1992:** The Chief of Army Staff complains to the Prime Minister that Intelligence Bureau tapping his telephone and monitoring his movement.
- December 1992:** President Ghulam Ishaq Khan is humiliated by 'Go Baba Go' slogans in the Parliament from the PPP, while the PML-N just watches. The PPP's Long March, with wink from Establishment, fails. Distance between the Prime Minister and the President grows, while the latter and the Chief of Army Staff draw closer.

- January 1993:** Just a week before his death, an emotionally stressed out Gen. Asif Nawaz tells Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif: "I am not planning a coup against you."
- January 1993:** Gen. Asif suddenly dies of heart attack. President Ghulam Ishaque Khan picks about-to-retire Gen. Wahid Kakar as the new Chief of Army Staff, hoping he will be 'his man.'
- February 1993:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif calls for removal of the Eighth Constitutional Amendment.
- April 17, 1993:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif denounces President Ghulam Ishaque Khan for 'palace intrigues.' Next day, President Ghulam Ishaque Khan sacks him with the Army's support.
- May 1993:** Nawaz Sharif goes to the court and to the streets, eliciting warm popular acclaim all over. Sensing the popular mood, the Army turns neutral and the Supreme Court restores Nawaz Sharif.
- June 1993:** Gen. Kakar mediates between President Ghulam Ishaque Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but to no avail. The Army decides to remove both and calls fresh elections under 'imported' from Washington Prime Minister Moin Qureshi, who has blessing of all parties.
- October 1993:** Corps Commander when told by a Karachi newspaper Editor (who later became Senator) that 'Nawaz Sharif will win the elections,' retorts: 'only if we let him.'
- October 1993:** Nawaz Sharif suspects Establishment hand in rigging as he gets more popular votes than Benazir Bhutto's PPP but less Parliamentary seats. However, he accepts poll results.
- May 1994:** Gen. Kakar mediates between Nawaz Sharif and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto offering 2-point formula for consensus on Kashmir and Nuclear policy. Nawaz Sharif turns down request, as well as suggestion to lead Pakistan Delegation to UN.
- 1995:** Director General Artillery, GHQ, Maj. Gen. Zaheerul Islam Abbasi is arrested with other colleagues for allegedly planning a "fundamentalist coup."
- January 1996:** President Farooq Leghari, using his prerogative, over-rules Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and appoints General Jehangir Karamat as Chief of Army Staff.
- March 1996:** Supreme Court judgment jolts the PPP government.
- Summer of 1996:** Backed by President Leghari, establishment begins informal consultations with opposition politicians on how to remove Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and what should follow her: fresh elections or a 2-year government of technocrats 'to sort out the mess.'
- November 1996:** Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's Government is sacked by President Leghari.
- January 1997:** President Leghari announces Council for Defence and National Security.
- February 1997:** Nawaz Sharif wins polls and immediately removes Eighth Constitutional Amendment,

with Benazir Bhutto's help.

- 1997:** Naval Chief, Admiral Mansoorul Haq is sacked for corruption.
- June 1997:** Government tussle starts with the Supreme Court over speedy trials and judges appointments. Gen. Karamat warns Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 'people becoming disillusioned with government,' while Prime Minister is upset that ISI is not 'feeding me full facts and information.'
- October 1997:** Gen. Karamat, cutting short London stay, returns to mediate a 'ceasefire' between Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who faces contempt of court proceedings. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif suspects covert Establishment nod to Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, discovers bugs in his office as well as waist-coat.
- Nov.-Dec. 1997:** After the Supreme Court storming incident, Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah writes to the Chief of Army Staff, who decides to be 'neutral,' effectively throwing his weight behind the Prime Minister, after majority of Corps Commanders say 'democratic mandate must continue.' Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and President Leghari resign.
- May 1998:** Government decides to go in for Nuclear tests: Services Chiefs - two oppose and one says "it is up to the Government to decide."
- July 1998:** After sanctions and serious economic crisis, Gen. Karamat invites experts and economists for briefings at the GHQ.
- October 5, 1998:** In speech to Naval War College, Gen. Karamat criticizes the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Government's 'insecurity-driven policies' and calls for formation of the National Security Council. Also says smaller provinces suffer from 'sense of deprivation.'
- October 6, 1998:** PONAM - alliance of small provinces & nationalist groups - is announced at Islamabad, echoing COAS views regarding 'growing sense of deprivation.'
- October 7, 1998:** Gen. Karamat is sacked and replaced by Gen. Pervez Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff.
- December 1998:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hands over control of nuclear programme to the Chief of Army Staff, who appoints Maj. Gen. Khalid Kidwai to oversee it.
- February 1999:** News is leaked to the media that Services Chiefs would not be going to Wagah border to receive Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. However, they receive him with salutes at helipad of the Governor's House, Lahore.
- May 1999:** Kargil incursion sparks new row between the Chief of Army Staff and Prime Minister with mutual blame-game.
- July 4, 1999:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flies to Washington for meeting with President Clinton. Subsequent US accounts of meeting say Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is fearful of military coup.

- August 1999:** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif forms 3-man ministerial committee under Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to oversee and monitor functioning of the ISI.
- Sept. 14, 1999:** Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA) is formed under Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan with one-point agenda of ousting government.
- Sept. 23, 1999:** Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif and Director General ISI Gen. Ziauddin visit Washington. The US State Department issues formal statement opposing any military intervention.
- October 3, 1999:** Gen. Pervez Musharraf sacks Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Tariq Parvez and news is 'leaked' to press that sacking due to alleged hobnobbing with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which for him becomes the proverbial 'last straw' and he makes up his mind to sack the COAS.
- October 12, 1999:** Fourth military coup takes place after General Musharraf's sacking is announced by the Prime Minister, who does not consult or inform any Cabinet Minister .
- October 17, 1999:** Gen. Musharraf announces National Security Council.
- January 2000:** National Command Authority for nuclear programme announced.
- December 2000:** Nawaz Sharif is exiled to Saudi Arabia as part of Clinton-sponsored deal.
- October 7, 2001:** Gen. Musharraf removes fellow coup-makers and installs new team, just as US military operations begin in Afghanistan.
- 2006:** Gen. Musharraf orders an expanded political role for the Military Intelligence to cover Karachi, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, while the ISI is somewhat sidelined.
- Jan. 24, 2007:** Gen. Musharraf has secret meeting with Benazir Bhutto in Abu Dhabi.
- March 9, 2007:** Sacking of Chief Justice in presence of 5 generals, sparks nationwide agitation.
- July 18, 2007:** Intelligence tells Musharraf that 8 out of 13 Supreme Court Judges support him, and will give a verdict in his favour.
- July 20, 2007:** All 13 Judges unanimously restore Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.
- July 28, 2007:** Gen. Musharraf has another meeting with Benazir Bhutto in Abu Dhabi.
- Nov. 1, 2007:** US Centcom Chief, Admiral Fallon, arrives in Islamabad to warn General Musharraf not to impose Emergency, but he still goes ahead.
- Nov. 29, 2007:** Gen. Musharraf takes off uniform, replaced by Gen. Kayani as Chief of Army Staff.

- April 2008:** Suspicious that Gen. Kayani is becoming his 'own man,' Gen. Musharraf thinks of replacing him but it is too late, as he is pre-empted.
- July 2008:** The PPP Government notifies control of the ISI under Interior Minister but notification is quickly withdrawn under pressure of the Army.
- July 2008:** After Asif Ali Zardari gets 'clearance' from President Bush for removing Musharraf and replacing him as President, he moves against Musharraf.
- August 2008:** Having lost support of the Army and the Supreme Court, and unwilling to face impeachment, President Musharraf resigns.
- November 2008:** Panicky after hoax phone call post-Mumbai, which had a fake 'Foreign Minister' of India threatening war, President Zardari asks the Chief of Army Staff to place forces on 'high alert' but he declines.
- March 2009:** Gen. Kayani intervenes to restore the Chief Justice.
- April 2009:** Army launches operation in Swat-Malakand with full support of the Government, and the opposition political forces..
- September 2009:** Corps Commanders criticize the Kerry-Lugar Bill.
- March 2010:** Director General ISI, Gen. Shuja Pasha, gets extension.
- March 2010:** Prior to Pakistan-US military dialogue, Gen. Kayani summons Federal Secretaries to GHQ for briefing. COAS is feted like royalty at Washington.
- April 2010:** Prime Minister Gilani praises Kayani as a 'pro-democracy General,' adding this will be a factor in deciding on his extension.
- April 2010:** After a serving Major General, former head of MI, is named in UN Report on Benazir assassination, Army seeks civilian-led probe to ascertain facts and it clears his name.
- May 5, 2010:** Foreign Minister formally disowns Musharraf Kashmir Policy.
- July 2010:** General Kayani's tenure as COAS is renewed for 3 years. A confident Prime Minister proclaims: 'now we will all stay on till 2013.'
- Sept. 15, 2010:** US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke says that the US 'supports a civilian, democratically-elected set-up in Pakistan.'
- Sept. 27, 2010:** Troika meets amidst brewing Court crisis, and a Presidency statement says the three agree to 'protect the democratic process and resolve all issues in accordance with the Constitution.'

Sept. 28, 2010: The New York Times, contrary to the official account of the troika meeting, says General Kayani 'confronted the President and Prime Minister over incompetence and corruption in the government' and pushed for a 'shake-up' including dismissal of tainted Ministers.

October 1, 2010: The Guardian says General Kayani has 'handed a list of corrupt and allegedly incompetent ministers to President Zardari, demanding their removal.'

End-Notes

1. Mark Bowden, "The Professor of War" Vanity Fair, May 2010: this adulatory piece on General David Petraeus praises him as the "the most competitive man on the planet".
2. Harinder Baweja, "A Soldier's Diary Kargil": (Books Today, 2000).
3. Robert Dallek "JFK's Second Term" The Atlantic, June 2003.
4. Dan Balz "Obama and Petraeus: A wary relationship" The Washington Post, October 1, 2010.
5. Michael Moore "Woodward Book Reveals That Civilian Control of the Military is a Joke" www.Alnet.net.org, September 30, 2010
6. Jay Adams and Philip Whitehead, "The Dynasty The Nehru-Gandhi Story" (Penguin Books, 1997) p. 228
7. Ravi Rikhya, "The Militarization of Mother India" (Prism India Paperbacks, 1990). P.39
8. Conversation with Professor Stephen Cohen in Islamabad on September 20, 2010, who quoted the then Indian Minister of State for Defence, Arun Singh.
9. Praful Bidwai "Kashmir's Dialogue of the Deaf" The News, September 27, 2010 terms such efforts as 'dangerous portents, nearly paralleling Pakistan'; Siddarth Srivasta 'India's army digs in over Siachen' Asia Times online, November, 16, 2006 refers to a 'rare instance of a senior army official commenting on an issue being handled at a diplomatic level'; A.G. Noorani 'Talkative Generals' in The Hindu has interesting & informative insights on India's own civil-military relationship.
10. "India's Democratic Oversight of the Defence Forces: What made it possible" (PIL DAT December 2008) p.9
11. Andrew Whitehead, "A Mission in Kashmir" (Viking, 2007) p.119-120
12. Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai's briefing to parliamentarians from Defence & Foreign Affairs Committees at Special Plans Division HQ, Chaklala, July 7, 2006.
13. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi's statement to parliament, May 5, 2010.
14. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijtt Ed. "Political Armies" (Zed Books, 2000) p.10; General Sudirman, founder of the Indonesian peoples armed forces declared on October 5, 1949, the essence of the dual function doctrine "The military should never allow themselves to submit to the power of a political party or group because the Armed Forces belong to the people as a whole" (p.152); Ataturk defined the Army's role as the 'ultimate guardian of the Republic' (p.163). For a frank Pakistani military perspective, see: General Jehangir Karamat "The future of democracy". The Nation , May 10, 2000. He writes: "The military wants to sit at the decision-making table as an accepted participant a co-equal and a partner", and that "it seems a military subordinate to civilian and political control is not what people want"; In their joint article Dr. Javid Iqbal, Dr. Hafeez Malik and Maj. Gen. @ Imtiaz Ali wrote in The News, July 16, 2000 on "Dilemma of National Governance in Pakistan", quoting General Shamim Alam Khan, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (1991-1994) that the political government "lacks the necessary will to enforce its authority on the Pakistan Armed Forces" and that the "political leadership has failed to present a united front in dealing with the Armed Forces." See also, Mushahid Hussain "Reforming the Armed Forces" The Nation, June 5, 2001, and also by same writer, "Pakistan's Establishment: A Profile" April 11, 1993. For a well-researched populist perspective, see Qayyum Nizami "Jarnail aur Siyasatdan" (Generals and Politics) (Jehangir Book Depot, 2006). For an informative, historical account of civil-military

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