

PILDAT

Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development
And Transparency

ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

2016



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PILDAT is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the mission to strengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan.

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The **Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan 2016** is a report prepared by PILDAT to evaluate the quality of democracy in Pakistan for the calendar year of 2016.

The report is based on data analysis and scores compiled by the PILDAT Team in addition to invaluable guidance provided by the members of the PILDAT Democracy Assessment Group – DAG. In order to facilitate research, PILDAT has made use of the following three tools, which also serve as the basis of its methodology for this particular assessment:

- i. A close monitoring of the developments relating to democracy throughout the period and preparing a qualitative assessment report listing and analyzing the developments which impacted democracy one way or the other.
- ii. A quantitative assessment of the quality of democracy based on scores of the Pakistan Specific Framework.
- iii. Findings of the PILDAT Public Opinion Poll on the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan conducted in July-August 2016.

The parameters of the Pakistan-Specific Framework, an indigenously developed framework by PILDAT, and the scoring received on it form the structure of this Report. Although the main analysis of the Report does not include scores on the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA) Democracy Assessment Framework, these are included in the appendix of the Report.

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
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PILDAT team has made every effort to ensure accuracy of the publicly available data and analyses based on it. Any omission, or error, therefore, is not deliberate. The views, analyses and scores in this report do not necessarily represent the views of DANIDA, the Government of Denmark, and the Royal Danish Embassy, Islamabad.

Lahore
January 2017

Quality of democracy in Pakistan in year 2016 is scored by PILDAT at 46% which is 4 percentage points below the score of 50% it received in 2015. Instead of a steady transition towards improvement, democracy scores in Pakistan year after year since 2013 show a somewhat tumultuous trend – while quality of democracy was scored at its highest in 4 years at 54% in 2013; the scores slid 10 percentage points in 2014 to 44%, regained a little to 50% in 2015 to have slipped again to 46% at the end of year 2016.

Figure 1: Democracy Assessment Scores: 2013-2016



These fluctuations in the yearly scores are closely tied to the developments in democracy witnessed each year in Pakistan: 2013 was viewed as a year of optimism for Pakistan's democracy, which saw the first civilian transition of power take place under a civilian President. However, during 2014, Pakistan's democratic journey was marred primarily because of the controversy surrounding the General Election 2013, along with the 126-day sit-in in Islamabad by the PTI and PAT, which almost saw the wrapping up of the democratic setup.

2015 finally saw the resolution of the controversy surrounding General Election 2013 with the PTI returning to the Parliament. Most of all, both the democratic system and the elected Government emerged as resilient after having weathered the political storm of 2014. Even though a constitutional equation in civil and military relations remained elusive, 2015 saw signs of improvement leading to a positive score. All, however, was not well with a democracy functioning at its best as 2015 ended with a somewhat curbed democratic journey through the introduction of Military courts.

One hoped fervently that 2016 would be the year where Pakistan moves forward towards a positive democratic consolidation through crucially required reforms in the effective functioning of key democratic institutions. After all democracy is a system that provides a legitimate means to achieve a beneficial end for the populace in addressing and resolving fundamental issues to the system of democratic governance. Instead, the year saw little, if

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

any, improvement in fundamental functioning of key democratic institutions rendering those almost completely ineffective in effectually resolving systemic issues behind concerns such as Panama leaks, elected Government's inability to exercise its constitutional writ to be the final arbiter on national security and foreign policy domains, and it's evident failure and perhaps even reluctance in institutionalizing consultative decision-making process in not just national security but other domains of basic democratic governance structures such as those of the Federal and Provincial Cabinets, Council of Common Interest, Legislatures. What's more, the system of democratic governance, once again, failed to even raise vital concerns plaguing the country's journey to peace, equitable growth and prosperity, let alone focus on resolving those to improve the country's democratic present and future.

By the end of 2016, it also became obvious that personality-based politics and weak internal democracy within political parties, along with a disregard for the rule of law remain critical areas of concern for Pakistan's democracy.

In terms of issues facing the democratic system, perhaps the biggest hurdle that Pakistan's democratic setup had to overcome during 2016 was the PTI's proposed lockdown of the national capital over the elected Government's alleged intransigence over the Panama Papers on November 02, 2016, which was eerily reminiscent of the *dharna* during 2014. In a regretful development, the elected Government preemptively sealed the national capital. The spectacle was played out again in the national media as an impending showdown between the elected Government and the PTI. Perhaps its crescendo was reached when the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Mr. Pervaiz Khattak, MPA, was stopped from coming to the national capital while he led a procession of PTI supporters supported by heavy machinery of the KP government to remove the obstacles as all the national highways into Islamabad were blocked.

Although PTI had a democratic right to protest, it was observed again that the party and its Chairman showed little restraint towards leaning on the military to oust the elected Federal Government of the PML-N. This was coupled by the debate surrounding the granting of extension to the outgoing COAS, Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif, with rumours abound that a coup was in the offing. The frustration surrounding Pakistan's stunted democratic progress in 2016 is marked by the sad fact that such apprehensions still surround the country's democratic set up.

Eventually, the taking up of the petition of the PTI, JI and Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed of the Awami Muslim League by the Supreme Court of Pakistan diffused the situation, much to the chagrin of various media outlets and political parties. While how that eventually plays out remains to be seen in the days to come, it is suffice to say that the country remains in the grip of a sensational political uncertainty regardless.

Scores on **Performance of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures** remained stagnant at 45% between 2015 and 2016. With regards to stunted progress in democratic institutions, consider the performance of the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures. Apart from the Pakistan Senate, which has continued to strive to set a high bar of performance amongst all of Pakistan's Legislatures, the performance of the National Assembly and the remaining four Provincial Legislatures, as well as any progress on required reforms in their effective functioning as representative institutions remained just as elusive in 2016. In terms of legislatures, Major reforms are required in strengthening both the architecture and effective use of the powers of oversight of the Executive, transparency and accessibility of the Legislatures and an in effective Parliamentary budget processes. Consider, for instance, the performance of Legislatures in effective use of their central power – the power over purse strings: the highest number of Budget Session's sittings amongst the Provincial Legislatures was for Provincial Assembly of Sindh (11 sittings), followed by the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Provincial Assembly of Balochistan (7 sittings each). The Provincial Assembly of the Punjab had the least number of sittings during the Budget Session for the current Parliamentary Year, with a total of 6 sittings. The National Assembly wrapped up its Budget Session in 15 sittings. Needless to say, time allocated is hardly commensurate to the duties of the Legislatures to

Table 1: Democracy Scorecard 2016

No.	Parameter	2014	2015	2016
1.	Overall Quality of Democracy	44%	50%	46%
2.	Performance of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures	49%	45%	45%
3.	Performance of National and Provincial Governments	38%	35%	30%
5.	Performance of the Unelected Executive	48%	42%	42%
6.	Performance of the Judiciary and Access to Justice	55%	49%	49%
7.	Performance of the Media	53%	50%	45%
8.	Institution and Effectiveness of Local Governments	19%	31%	40%
9.	Constitutional Framework	57%	50%	52%
10.	Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector and Rule of Law	34%	29%	30%
11.	Electoral Process and Management	54%	51%	53%
12.	Performance of Political Parties vis-à-vis Democracy Within as well as Outside	45%	44%	42%
13.	Civil Society	56%	51%	51%

take stock of the year's finances before approving next year's budgets. Compare this to the time devoted by the Legislatures in developed democracies such as India where members of the Lok Sabha spend an average of 90 days deliberating upon the year's budget proposals before passage.

Perhaps the biggest problem with regards to especially the National Assembly was the fact that it continued to be sidelined as a forum for debate, discussion, and resolution of pressing national issues. Consider the issue of the Panama Leaks, which largely played out in the streets and then in the Supreme Court, rather than a solution to it being sought inside the Parliament. The deliberations of the Parliamentary Committee on the formation of Terms of Reference for the inquiry into the Panama Papers remained completely fruitless, spanning over a period of 67 days.

In addition, particularly for the Prime Minister of Pakistan, who managed to attend only 10% of the total sittings of the National Assembly during 2016, it emerged that even the Chief Ministers of the respective Provincial Governments had failed to maintain a robust relation with the respective Legislatures. For example, the Chief Minister of the Punjab only attended 8% of the total Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016; the Chief Minister of KP attended 23% of the total Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016; the Chief Minister of Balochistan attended a total of 51% of the total Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016 and the Chief Minister of Sindh attended a total of 61% of the Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016.

Perhaps one reason for the National Assembly to remain sidelined as an institution in Pakistan's democracy stems from the fact that there is a huge gap between the voters' expectations of their elected representatives, which includes work that should ideally be carried out by elected members of the Local Governments, and the MNAs actual responsibilities of representation, oversight and legislation.

In another major development, 2016 saw the salaries of legislators being increased by almost 146% and that too thorough a decision take by the Federal Cabinet, unlike in the past.¹

Score on **Performance of National and Provincial Governments** witnessed a 5 percentage point decline from not-so-enviable score of 35% in 2015 to a mere 30% in 2016. A consistent lack of institutionalization in decision-making on the part of both the Federal and Provincial Governments has continued to be a problem in 2016 as well. Consider the Federal Cabinet, which is supposed to meet at least 52 times in a year, but could only manage to meet 6 times during 2016. In a welcome development, however, in its judgment on August 18, 2016, the Supreme Court struck down Rule 16 (2) of the Rules of Business of the Federal Government, 1973, which gave the Prime Minister the discretionary power to bypass the Federal Cabinet.

This reluctance to hold regular meetings of the Cabinet can also be observed at the provincial level as well. For example, the Cabinet of the Provincial Government of the Punjab met for a total of 3 times in 2016, compared to 3 times in 2015. The Cabinet of the Provincial Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has met for a total of 7 times in 2016, compared to 5 times in 2015. The Cabinet of the Provincial Government of Balochistan has met for a total of 6 times in 2016, compared to 5 times in 2015. The Cabinet of the Provincial Government of Sindh has met for a total of 6 times in 2016, compared to 6 times in 2015.

Score on **Performance of the Unelected Executive** remained unchanged at 42% between the years of 2015 and 2016 depicting the lack of positive progress. With regards to operations of the Unelected Executive, i.e., the bureaucracy or the civil service, free from political considerations, no new laws or policies of significance were recorded for 2016. Although during 2016, the Federal Ministry of Planning Development and Reforms worked on at least 43 areas of civil service reforms, it ignored suggesting any recipe to check the most haunting aspect of the politicization of bureaucracy. The Ministry instead focused on issues like changing civil service entry exam system, introduction of new streams in civil bureaucracy, transformation of Establishment Division, improvement in compensation package, initiation of civil servants exchange program etc. but did not suggest anything to protect the bureaucracy from external influences. Therefore, especially with regards to the civil service, including the police, it is observed that these crucial arms of functioning of State do not have the same independence that is observed in the case of the Military. Perhaps the low Approval Ratings of 29% and 18% in Government officers and the Police with regards to how trust worthy these institutions are is an indication of the need for reforms in these.

Performance of the Judiciary and Access to Justice is scored at 49% for the consecutive years of 2015 and 2016. With regards to the performance of the judiciary the main problem continues to be the backlog of cases across all tiers of Pakistan's judiciary. Although the statistics in this regard are being compiled for 2016, for the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 27,916 cases were pending during the start of 2016. By the end of August 2016, this number rose 30404.²

It is important to note in this regard that there is only one body under the Constitution, which is to take note of the performance of the judiciary, which is the Supreme Judicial Council. However, its dormancy is continually pointed out by not only various sections of the media, but also by the Supreme Court Bar

1. For more details, please see: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1298276>

2. For details, please see: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1183991/new-judicial-year-sc-faces-record-surge-number-cases>

Association and the Pakistan Bar Council.

Although the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court has reportedly ordered the formation of a '*comprehensive monitoring and evaluation mechanism*'³ along with the Chief Justice of the Sindh High Court also ordering review of performance of the lower judiciary, these are only occasional judicial strictures while there being no effective mechanism for judges' accountability.

PILDAT believes that with regards to the improving performance of the judiciary with regards to cases of a civil nature, there is a need to introduce various kinds of alternative dispute resolutions methods. On the other hand, with regards to criminal cases, there is a need to reform the criminal justice system, along with improving the investigation and prosecution services.

However, 2016 has passed without institution of major reforms in the legal process despite the clock ticking on expiry of the 21st Constitutional Amendment. Although reforms in Pakistan's judicial system seemed to be a cornerstone of the National Action Plan, it seems that the Government may be seeking an extension in 21st Constitutional Amendment. Indeed, this seems to be the case with the Protection of Pakistan Act whose sunset clause for detention powers of the paramilitary forces expired in July 2016.

From the perspective of quality of democracy, **Performance of the Media** has seen a negative score of 45%, which is 5 percentage points below the score of 50% assigned to this indicator in 2015. With regards to independence of the media, revenue from advertisements is the primary monetary source for all forms of media outlets in Pakistan leading these providers of advertisements to have a huge influence on those outlets. Telecommunication companies, banks, real estate developers, among others as main sources of advertisements, therefore yield significant influence on the conduct of the media outlets. This was worst depicted when the Supreme Court ordered halting of construction of a part of Bahria Town in Karachi in September 2016 and only two media outlets reported on the issue. In addition, it has been observed in the case of various media outlets that their coverage tilts in favour of certain political parties explicitly. For example, Samaa TV and ARY TV are decidedly pro-PTI and anti-Government. On the other hand, Geo TV is decidedly anti-PTI.

It is perhaps for this particular reason that according to PILDAT's Public Opinion Poll, although the Federal Government's performance in ensuring the freedom of media and that it carries out its duties within confines of the law was the highest rated at 64%, the ratings of the nation-wide respondents seemed to be on the borderline at 51% with regards to whether the Media ensured that it is behaving professionally and is reporting in a balanced and accurate manner. However, this only denotes that although public opinion has firmly become positive regarding the Government's management of Media affairs, it can swing either way with regards to the Media exhibiting responsibility itself. Thus questions still persist regarding public trust and confidence in Pakistan's media, which is considered to be the fourth pillars in a functioning democracy.

While **Institution and Effectiveness of Local Governments** has received a relatively higher score of 40% in 2016 compared to 31% in 2015, the score merely reflects the existence of elected Local Government across Pakistan (especially in Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Cantonment Boards and Islamabad Capital Territory) and not how effectively the Local Government system has been designed to deliver across the country. Among these concerns, local government elections are also yet to be held in FATA and Gilgit Baltistan. Functionality of Local Governments by themselves is not a reason for complacency. It needs to be seen that whether the powers guaranteed by Article 140-A of the Constitution have been

3. For details, please see: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/145651-Performance-of-judicial-officers-to-be-evaluated-says-LHC-CJ>

devolved to the third tier as was the intent of the Constitution. This only seems to be the case in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whereas the Local Government structures in Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, Cantonment Boards and ICT remain a cause of concern with regards to their autonomy and devolution of powers. The situation is particularly worrisome in Punjab, which towards the wee end of 2016 promulgated the Punjab Civil Administration Ordinance 2016. This has reintroduced the office of the Deputy Commissioner along with his/her control over departments that provide direct services to the people such as health, education, communication and works etc.

Pakistan's **Constitutional Framework** received the score of 52% in 2016, up from 50% in 2015. This was primarily because of the introduction of the 22nd Constitutional Amendment, which amended the long overdue basis of membership of the members of the Election Commission of Pakistan, with the now the post also being available to former bureaucrats.

Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector and Rule of Law continues to be the centrally-negative indicator of Pakistan's democratic system. Scored at 30% in 2016 compared to 29% in 2015, Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector continued to be a problem for Pakistan's democracy in 2016. Apart from the public spats between the elected Government and the Military leadership on the implementation of the National Action Plan, 2016 saw the civil-military imbalance deepen further as the Military leadership seemed to be taking the leading role on matters of national security and certain domains of our foreign policy, with the elected Government appearing to act as an auxiliary. However, in an important development and milestone in Pakistan's democratic journey, a change in Military command was witnessed at the end of November 2016, even though rumours continued to support the contrary. The credit for this must reside with both the former COAS, who announced his retirement on due date almost 9 months in advance, and the Prime Minister, who stuck to the principal of not granting an extension, regardless of the shrill cries emanating from various political and media circles in this regard. However, civil-military relations in Pakistan still remains the one factor upon which the quality of democracy single-handedly hinges as a whole system.

The near dormancy of the National Security Committee, which only met a total of six times since its formation in August 2013, highlights another aspect of this area of concern, where the lack of institutionalization for decision-making related to matters of national security persists.

Electoral Process and Management, scored at 53% in 2016 compared to 51% in 2015, essentially depicts the only major development of the passage of the 22nd Constitutional Amendment, which brought about much-needed and long-demanded reform in the qualification of the Chief and Members of the Election Commission of Pakistan. Apart from this, in what can only be termed as a delayed achievement in light of the timelines it set for itself, the Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms, which was supposed to complete its work by August 2014, was finally able to send a consolidated electoral reforms legislative package to the Parliament, by the name of Elections Bill 2017 on December 18, 2016.

Performance of Political Parties vis-à-vis Democracy Within as well as Outside received a score of 42% in 2016 compared to a 44% score in 2015. Internal Democracy of Political Parties continued to be a liability for the quality of Pakistan's democracy during 2016 as well. Even though there were some positive developments to report, such as the intra-party elections of the PML-N, which were undertaken as more of a mechanized ritual, and the establishment of the MQM as an indigenous party, rather than being a satellite run from London, no substantial improvement was noticed. In fact, a major set back was observed particularly for the PTI, which was supposed to be a role model for other political parties when it came to internal democracy. The party's cancellation of intra-party elections, allegedly because of its agitation campaign was a significant setback with regards to internal democracy of political parties in Pakistan. Therefore, as noted before, the major political parties with significant electoral success, such as the PTI,

PML-N and PPP continued to be lengthened shadows of their leaders, with little or no institutionalized decision-making in place within the parties on important policy matters.

At the unchanged score of 51% between 2015-2016, **Civil Society** in Pakistan continues to work in much the same space as before. Although it has been able to achieve some success such as in relation to unblocking of YouTube in April 2016, and the recent case of Mr. Imdad Ali's hanging, it has been seen that most of the civil society organizations are woefully ignorant of issues such as poverty eradication, consumer rights protection, environmental protection, etc. and finding workable solutions through working within the democratic setup. In addition, most of the NGOs working in Pakistan operate on the basis of foreign funding, with very little resource generation for themselves, by themselves. Therefore, many of these foreign donors get to set the agenda for the NGOs working in the country. The subject of possible new restrictions on NGO through a new law keeps coming up for discussion at various fora as a draft law to 'regulate' the NGOs also keeps resurfacing. Apparently, there seems to be a desire and possibly a plan in certain sections of the federal and some provincial governments to 'controll' the NGOs.

ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF
DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN: 2016

This report analyses the major developments impacting the quality of democracy in Pakistan in 2016. This analysis is undertaken on 11 main parameters which cover the key tenets of Pakistan's democracy. These include the following:

- i. Performance of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures
- ii. Performance of National and Provincial Governments
- iii. Performance of the Unelected Executive
- iv. Performance of the Judiciary and Access to Justice
- v. Performance of the Media
- vi. Institution of Local Governments
- vii. Constitutional Framework
- viii. Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector and Rule of Law
- ix. Electoral Process and Management
- x. Performance of Political Parties vis-à-vis Democracy Within as well as Outside
- xi. Civil Society

Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

Representation on Public Issues of Concern by the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

National Assembly of Pakistan

According to PILDAT's Public Opinion Poll, for June 2015-May 2016, **Terrorism** (Approval Rating of 23%) was identified as the biggest issue by the people of Pakistan across the country. With regards to the National Assembly taking requisite action on this, a resolution was passed on January 21, 2016 condemning the terrorist attack at Bacha Khan University. Another resolution was passed on March 15, 2016 asking the Government to take effective steps to better manage the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, along with a resolution passed on August 01, 2016 condemning the murder of Mr. Amjad Sabri. Three Calling Attention Notices also debated in the National Assembly during 2016 with regards to various incidents of terrorism in the country.

Inflation (Approval Rating of 18%), which was identified as the second largest issue nationwide, was also intermittently taken up by the National Assembly. A resolution was passed on January 12, 2016 asking the Government to take steps to control the price hike in the country. A similar resolution was passed again on May 17, 2016. Inflation also came under discussion once during the Budget Session, 2016.

The **Energy Crisis** (Approval Rating of 17%) was identified as the fourth biggest issue by the nation-wide respondents, which was only dealt with through a resolution passed on October 04, 2016, urging the Government for expeditious construction of the Diamer Basha dam.

The fourth largest issue identified by the nation-wide respondents was of **Corruption** (Approval Rating of 12%). Due to the emergence of Panama Leaks, accountability was the major topic of discussion in the Legislature. Almost four sittings of the National Assembly

were dedicated to the issue of Panama Leaks particularly, and corruption in general, which also saw the participation of the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the PTI, Mr. Imran Khan. However, no concrete legislative measure or action is there to be reported in this regard.

With particular reference to the Panama Leaks, an issue that served as a major political fault line for 2016, the matter, instead of being resolved in the Parliament, was taken elsewhere, including the streets. With the PTI's return to the Parliament on December 14, 2016, it is hoped that the matter is resolved through the Assembly, although it is also pending in front of the Supreme Court.

The fifth largest issue of **Unemployment** (Approval Rating of 12%) was not raised in the National Assembly even once.

Provincial Assembly of the Punjab

Punjab-wise respondents also identified **Terrorism** (Approval Rating of 23%) as the biggest issue for the province. The Provincial Assembly passed a total of 6 resolutions regarding the law and order situation and the curbing of terrorism in the province, including related to the Bacha Khan University attack in January 2016 and Lahore's Gulshan Park terrorist attack of March 27, 2016. It also passed a unique resolution on February 05, 2016, calling upon the electronic and print media to build public opinion against terrorist activities in the country. In addition, two Calling Attention Notices were also taken up related to terrorism related incidents in the province.

The **Energy Crisis** (Approval Rating of 17%) was identified as the second biggest issue by the respondents from the Punjab. Three Calling Attention Notices related to power thefts and electricity load shedding taken up by the Provincial Assembly for the purpose during 2016.

Inflation, which was identified as the third biggest problem, was not taken up in the Provincial Assembly even once.

Corruption (Approval Rating of 12%) was identified as the fourth biggest issue. Even in the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab, the issue of Panama Leaks came under discussion at least 6 times. The Opposition led by the PTI also staged 2 walkouts in this regard.

Unemployment (Approval Rating of 11%) was not even taken up once by the members of the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab.

Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Respondents of the Public Opinion Poll from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa identified Energy Crisis (Approval Rating of 29%) as the biggest issue for the province. In this regard, a total of two resolutions were passed regarding equitable distribution of energy and infrastructure projects under the CPEC. Another resolution was also passed on May 27, 2016, urging the Federal Government to stop electricity load shedding during the month of Ramadan.

Inflation (Approval Rating of 19%), identified as the second biggest issue by the respondents from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, came under discussion only once in the Assembly when a Calling Attention Notice related to increasing price of food items was taken up on April 03, 2016.

Terrorism (Approval Rating of 17%) was identified as the third biggest issue by the respondents from KP. In this regard a resolution was passed on August 09, 2016 calling upon the Federal Government to make the National Action Plan more effective by extending the Anti Terrorism Act of 2014, which expired in June 2016. One Adjournment Motion was also taken up to increase the number of the police force in

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the aftermath of the Bacha Khan University attack in January 2016.

With regards to Corruption (Approval Rating of 15%) one resolution was passed by the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on October 05, 2016 to make investigations into the Panama Leaks through the Supreme Court.

The issue of Unemployment (Approval Rating of 7%) was not even discussed once in the Assembly during 2016.

Provincial Assembly of Balochistan

The respondents from Balochistan identified Terrorism (Approval Rating of 28%) as the biggest issue for the province. With regards to action emanating from the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, two resolutions were passed by regarding incidents of terrorism in the province. The one passed on September 28, 2016 called on the Provincial Government to introduce unified command and control of policing in the province, where almost 70% of the province's territory is marked as 'B Area' under control of the Frontier Corps.

Inflation (Approval Rating of 18%) was identified as the second biggest issue for the province by the respondents, and in this regard, one resolution was passed on March 18, 2016 regarding reduction of petroleum prices in the province.

Unemployment (Approval Rating of 17%) was identified as the third largest issue and figured heavily in the Assembly's agenda during 2016. In this regard, six jointly tabled resolutions demanded legislation for implementation of weightage formula for induction in provincial departments, reviewing promotion policy of police officers in Balochistan, filling out vacant posts in WAPDA and its attached departments, providing employment to youngsters in federal corporations and government institutions as per quota, representing Balochistan in Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.

The respondents from the province identified Energy Crisis (Approval Rating of 6%) as the fourth largest issue for the province. In this regard, a resolution regarding implementation of water quota agreed by the provinces was passed on October 03, 2016. Two other resolutions on the similar issue were jointly sponsored demanding that provision of additional electricity supply to various districts of Balochistan and initiating survey and furnishing funds for construction of small dams in various districts to store rain water be taken up immediately.

Corruption (Approval Rating of 5%), identified as the fifth biggest issue by the respondents from Balochistan, was not taken up by the Provincial Assembly even once.

Provincial Assembly of Sindh

The respondents from Sindh identified Inflation (Approval Rating of 22%) as the biggest issue for the province. However, no deliberation took place in the Assembly on this during 2016.

With regards to Unemployment (Approval Rating of 18%), identified as the second biggest issue by the respondents from Sindh, the Provincial Assembly passed two resolutions related to the subject of labor laws. These resolutions sought to regulate the employment in factories, shops and other commercial establishments and provide for the labor rights.

Terrorism (Approval Rating of 17%) was identified as the third biggest issue by the respondents from Sindh. The Assembly took the subject up once during 2016, due to one Adjournment Motion on May 17, 2016.

The Energy Crisis (Approval Rating of 11%) was identified as the fourth largest issue by the respondents from Sindh. However, no deliberations took place in the Provincial Assembly on the subject during 2016.

Corruption (Approval Rating of 10%) identified as the fifth biggest issue, was taken up once through a resolution passed against activities of NAB in the province, which were deemed to be needlessly interfering the affairs of the Provincial Government of Sindh on August 06, 2016.

Representativeness of the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

With regards to how representative are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies of the country's population and its various segments, the following features of the various Legislatures might be taken into consideration:

National Assembly of Pakistan:

- i. 20% of the members of the National Assembly are females, whereas 34% of the Chairpersons of the Standing Committees are also female.
- ii. Only 3% of the members of the National Assembly belong to minority groups

Provincial Assembly of Balochistan:

- i. Total of 18% of the membership of the Assembly is of females, while 9% of the members belong to minority groups
- ii. Chairpersons of almost 1/3rd of the Standing Committees are females.
- iii. The Speaker of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan is also a female.

Provincial Assembly of the Punjab:

- i. Total of 21% of the legislators in the Assembly are females. Only 5% of the Chairpersons of the Standing Committees are females.
- ii. 9% of the members of the Assembly belong to minority groups

Provincial Assembly of Sindh:

- i. Female MPAs constitute of 18% of the total Assembly membership. 18% of the Chairpersons of the Standing Committees are also females.
- ii. The Deputy Speaker of the Provincial Assembly is also a female.
- iii. Total of 7% of the Assembly Members belong to minority groups.

Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa:

- i. There total strength of female representatives in the KP Assembly is 18% while 11% of the Chairpersons of Standing Committees are women
- ii. Total of 7% of the Assembly Members belong to minority groups.
- iii. The Deputy Speaker of the Provincial Assembly is also a female.

Apart from the gender based and minorities' consideration, it is to be noted that perhaps the biggest obstacle to effective representativeness in Pakistan's legislatures is that the person of average means cannot become a members of the Assembly. For example, according to the assets filed in 2016, the average worth of an MNA's assets is almost 71.6 million rupees. Consider also that the profession having the greatest representation across the National and Provincial Assemblies are agriculturalists or landed elite. Compare this with the average income of a Pakistani citizen for 2016, which is almost Rs. 7,500/month.

Therefore, politics remains the exclusive reserve of those with means and till the time political parties in Pakistan do not have public funding, marginalized economic groups will have no representation in the Legislatures.

Legislation by the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

National Assembly of Pakistan

Of the 45 Bills passed by the National Assembly during 2016, 21% were related to the reforming of the judicial system, 11% were related to regulating financial transactions to curb corruption and tax evasion, 17% were related to the security infrastructure of the province, 9% were related to the economic policy and 4% related to the creation of educational institutes in the country. 2 laws were also passed regarding the electoral landscape of the country, including a constitutional amendment related to the working of the ECP.

Provincial Assembly of the Punjab

Of the 42 Bills passed by the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab during 2016, 17% were related to boosting the security infrastructure of the province, and three bills were passed to lead to the creation of new universities. Five corporate bodies namely the Punjab Mass Transit Authority, the Punjab Safe Cities Authority, the Fort Monroe Development Authority, the Punjab Infrastructure Development Authority and the Punjab Agriculture, Food and Drug Authority were created through statutes. A landmark legislation related to Protection Women Against Violence was also passed in 2016. Almost 13% of the Bills passed related to economic policies in the province.

Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

A total of 27 Bills were passed by the Assembly during 2016. Out of these, a total of 33% of the Bills passed related to citizens' rights including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare (Amendment) Bill, 2016, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Lissaail-e-Walmahroom Foundation Bill, 2015, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Retirement Benefits and Death Compensation (Amendment) Bill, 2016, etc. Amongst these was also the landmark legislation by the Assembly regarding the Conflict of Interest.

For easy access to justice for all citizens, the Assembly approved the Establishment of Civil Mobile Courts Bill, 2016 that provides for the establishment of Civil Mobile Courts in the province, besides providing inexpensive and expeditious disposal of certain claims and disputes.

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly passed three legislations on health during the year. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Foundation Bill, 2016 was passed to establish health foundation to encourage health related campaigns and initiatives in the province. Moreover, the House approved the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institution Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 2016 and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 2016 to restructure the criteria of creating, redesigning and abolishing of posts according to the approved annual budget.

Provincial Assembly of Balochistan

A total of 23 Bills were passed by the Assembly during 2016. Out of these, 38% were related to boosting the security infrastructure in the province. Besides that, a total of 4 Bills were passed to lead to the creation of new universities in the province. Besides Finance Bill, the Assembly levied sales tax on services and passed law to set up the provincial revenue authority.

Provincial Assembly of Sindh

The Assembly passed 25 Bills during 2016. Of these almost 8% were related to boosting the security infrastructure of the province, Five Bills were also passed leading to the creation of new universities in the province. However, in a commendable development, the Provincial Assembly of Sindh passed 7 Bills, which is 28% of the legislation during 2016, related to the subject of labor. These laws sought to regulate the employment in factories, shops and other commercial establishments and provide for the labor rights.

Oversight of the Executive by the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

With regards to evaluating the oversight undertaken by the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures of the Executive, the following questions were taken into consideration

- i. Whether the Standing Committees have *suo moto* powers or not?
- ii. Whether the Standing Committees scrutinize the budget before it is passed?
- iii. Whether the Standing Committees or the Parliament have the power to hold the Government to account for any extra expenditure it has made?
- iv. Whether the Parliament and its Committees have adequate research staff and facilities?
- v. Whether all the Bills passed were routed through the Standing Committees or not?

With regards to the National Assembly, it was noted that the Legislature's Standing Committees do have *suo moto* powers. With regards to powers of the Standing Committees to scrutinize the budget before it is passed, the National Assembly's rules specifically bar the Finance Bill from being referred to the Standing Committees, which is the single biggest reform required in the Budget Process in the National Assembly.

In addition, when the Parliament was presented the Federal Budget 2016-2017 on June 03, 2016, soon after, the Finance Minister, Senator Muhammad Ishaq Dar sought the Parliament's *post-facto* approval for a Rs. 261 billion 'supplementary budget' to cover governmental expenditure overruns in the outgoing fiscal year which was almost 28% higher than the figure approved last year.

Each Standing Committee does not have its dedicated research staff. In fact, sometimes a single official serves as the Secretary for different Standing Committees of the National Assembly.

It also needs to be noted that according to PILDAT's research, Of the 45 Bills passed by the NA during 2016, only 65% were routed through the relevant Standing Committees.

It needs to be noted that the overall architecture of the Standing Committees in the Provincial Legislatures is also more or less the same as the National Assembly.

Only the Standing Committees of the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab and of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have *suo moto* powers like the National Assembly. In the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, however, the workings of the Standing Committees have been particularly dismal, as the majority of the Standing Committees of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan were not functional till the end of 2015 since their Chairpersons were not elected. However, by November 2016, all the Chairpersons of the Standing Committees have been elected.

Of the 42 Bills passed by the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab during 2016, 73% were routed through the relevant Committees. Of the 27 Bills passed by the KP Assembly during 2016, 81% were routed through the relevant Committees. Of the 23 Bills passed by the Balochistan Assembly, 53% were routed through the relevant Committees. Of the 25 Bills passed during 2016, 83% of the Bills were routed through the relevant Committees.

Transparency and Accessibility of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

Table 2 gives the details regarding the main parameters used to evaluate the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures' performance in this regard.

Table 2: Transparency and Accessibility of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

No.	Parameter/Legislature	National Assembly	Provincial Assembly of the Punjab	Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Provincial Assembly of Balochistan	Provincial Assembly of Sindh
1.	Is the attendance record of the legislators available online?	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
2.	If it is available, is it so on open format?	No	No	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3.	Is the attendance record of Committee meetings available online?	No	No	No	No	No
4.	Does the Legislature have a public petitions portal?	No	No	No	No	No
5.	Was there any initiative recorded which gave citizens the opportunity to directly participate in the legislation process?	No	No	No	No	No
6.	Are there restrictions in place on journalists to report on the Assembly sessions, such as frequent in-camera sessions?	No	No	No	No	No

Ineffective Parliamentary Budget Process

Given that significant reforms are still required across the National and 4 Provincial legislatures to strengthen the Budget process before its passage, the Budget Sessions for Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies for the fourth Parliamentary Year, i.e. June 2016-May 2017 seemed to be a repeat performance of the previous years' budget sessions.

The highest number of Budget Session's sittings, amongst the Provincial Legislatures were for Provincial Assembly of Sindh (11 sittings), followed by the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Provincial Assembly of Balochistan (7 sittings each). The Provincial Assembly of the Punjab had the least number of sittings during the Budget Session for the current Parliamentary Year, with a total of 6 sittings. The National Assembly wrapped up its Budget Session in 15 sittings.

With limited time available to scrutinize the Provincial Budgets and no adequate powers with Standing Committees to undertake in-depth reviews of the Provincial Budgets, year after year, Budget Sessions see mere rubber-stamping the Executive's budget by the Provincial Legislatures.

PILDAT has been making recommendations to strengthen the Budget process in the Parliament and

Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan, which include increasing the duration of the Budget process to at least 30 – 45 days and changes in the Rules of Procedure of the Provincial Assemblies to allow Standing Committees both power and time to review the Budget both before and after its introduction.

National and Provincial Governments

Collective Responsibility of the Federal and Provincial Cabinets

In what can be termed as a landmark for Pakistan's democracy, the Supreme Court's judgment of August 18, 2016 on Civil Appeals No. 1428 of 2016, pertaining to tax exemptions for importers of cellular phones and textile goods, struck down Rule 16 (2) of the Rules of Business of the Federal Government, 1973, which gave the Prime Minister the discretionary power to bypass the Federal Cabinet.

The Supreme Court judgment categorically laid down the constitutional dictate that the Federal Government is the Federal Cabinet, which consists of the Prime Minister and the Ministers. The Prime Minister is the first amongst equals in this regard, where his office can neither supplant nor substitute the Federal Cabinet.

PILDAT considers the judgment to be a critical indictment of the personalized form of governance centered around the office of the Prime Minister, which has been the hallmark of various governments of different political parties in Pakistan since the passage of the 1973 constitution. The centrality and discretionary powers which have come to be associated with the office of the Prime Minister erroneously perpetuated a Prime Ministerial form of Government instead of a Parliamentary one, as originally envisaged by our Constitution.

An unfortunate consequence of this has been the dormancy of various official fora for consultation and decision-making. For example, the Federal Cabinet has been detrimentally side-lined in the decision-making structure under the current Government. It was only able to meet a dismal 23 times; a mere 14% of the total of 186 times it should have met till now. This lack of collective consultation and decision-making is not only reflected in the dormancy of the Cabinet, but also amongst the Council of Common Interest (CCI) and the National Security Committee (NSC). No meaningful consultation seems to be taking place at the level of the political parties general councils or executive committees.

With regards to how frequently the Federal and Provincial Cabinets met during 2016, the following facts may be taken into consideration:

1. The Federal Cabinet has met for a total of 5 times in 2016, as compared to 4 times in 2015. Rules of Business stipulate at least 52 meetings of the Cabinet every year.
2. The Cabinet of the Provincial Government of the Punjab has met for a total of 3 times in 2016, compared to 3 times in 2015.
3. The Cabinet of the Provincial Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has met for a total of 7 times in 2016, compared to 5 times in 2015.
4. The Cabinet of the Provincial Government of Balochistan has met for a total of 6 times in 2016, compared to 5 times in 2015.
5. The Cabinet of the Provincial Government of Sindh has met for a total of 6 times in 2016, compared to 6 times in 2015.

Relationship between the Prime Minister/Chief Ministers and the Legislatures

The kind of relationship that exists between the Prime Minister and the National Assembly, and the Chief Ministers and the respective Provincial Legislatures is perhaps best exemplified by the attendance of the

Assembly sessions by these officials. In this regards, the following facts might be taken into consideration:

1. The Prime Minister has only attended 10% of the total National Assembly sittings for 2016.
2. The Chief Minister of the Punjab has only attended 8% of the total Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016.
3. The CM of KP has attended 43% of the total Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016.
4. The CM of Balochistan has attended a total of 51% of the total Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016.
5. The Chief Minister of Sindh has attended a total of 61% of the Provincial Assembly sittings for 2016.

Independence of the Unelected Executive

New laws or policies of significance, with regards to independence of the unelected Executive, i.e. the Bureaucracy, from political considerations in its operations is to be recorded for 2016.

During 2016, the Federal Ministry of Planning Development and Reforms worked on at least 43 areas of civil service reforms but ignored suggesting any recipe to check the most haunting aspect of the politicization of bureaucracy.

The Ministry focused on issues like changing civil service entry exam system, introduction of new streams in civil bureaucracy, transformation of Establishment Division, improvement in compensation package, beginning of performance agreement for federal ministries, initiation of civil servants exchange program etc. but did not suggest anything to protect the bureaucracy from external influences.

Although the Ministry also revised the Estacode, which is civil establishment's (civil servants) code, the dilemma surrounding it is that it has already become irrelevant and rarely followed because of political interference in the civilian bureaucracy.

For example, the Estacode talks of appointment of a government servant against any post for a tenure and also proposes action against those using external influences. But despite such unambiguous rules and policies, the postings and transfers in the civil service are deeply politicized, and fall prey to political expediencies, as the average tenure of a civil servant in Pakistan, employed by the Federal Government, is a dismal 9 months.

Therefore, especially with regards to the civil service, including the police, it is observed that they do not have the same independence that is observed in the case of the Military.

Judiciary/Access to Justice

With regards to the independence of the judiciary in Pakistan, it needs to be noted that the judicial activism that came to be associated with the tenure of Justice (Retd.) Iftikhar Chaudhary saw further rollback in 2016.

The Judiciary in Pakistan, both in its higher and lower tiers, appears to be a well-knit community, where the powers of appointment are solely concentrated in the hands of the judges themselves.

Consider the workings of the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest body for accountability of the judges themselves. The Supreme Judicial Council is a constitutional body comprising five senior SC and high court judges. It has jurisdiction to hold inquiries related to allegations of misconduct or incapacity against

judges of the superior judiciary and to make recommendations to the president of Pakistan, who subsequently may remove the judge from office.

The honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Anwar Zaheer Jamali observed on October 05, 2016 that the SJC has been rendered ineffective because of prolonged delays in deciding complaints: according to the CJ, 90 percent of cases before the Supreme Judicial Council have become moot as the accused judges retired while their cases were still pending.

So the greatest threat to the independence of the Judiciary, and its accountability seems to not be some external circumstances, but a weak process of accountability within the judiciary itself.

With regards to how completely and quickly are judiciary's orders implemented, it emerged that perhaps the single biggest issue of concern in this regard was the formation of functional Local Governments, a case which the Supreme Court had taken up in 2013, and ordered the Federal and Provincial Governments to hold Local Government elections then as well.

However, it is regretful that even though the judiciary pushed the Elected Governments on the matter, Local Governments are still not functional across the whole of Pakistan.

In addition, the clock is certainly ticking on 21st Constitutional Amendment, which is set to expire on January 05, 2017, with the Federal Government unable to present any concrete reforms on Pakistan's apparently dilapidated justice system till now. Although reforms in Pakistan's judicial system seemed to be a cornerstone of the National Action Plan, it seems that the Government may be seeking an extension in 21st Constitutional Amendment. Indeed, this seems to be the case with the Protection of Pakistan Act whose sunset clause for detention powers of the paramilitary forces expired in July 2016.

One keeps on hearing of different reports being presented to the Prime Minister for judicial reforms. However, given that no comprehensive constitutional package seems to be in the offing right now, it seems that the Government may revert to introducing amendments at the last moment, a penchant that has come to be associated with its style of governance.

Independence of Media

Media is a vital element in building a State. It is considered to be the fourth pillar of a democracy. With more than 300 big and small Urdu dailies, 30 odd English dailies, 91 private TV channels and 138 radio stations, media indeed has become a force of sorts, especially in the country democratic evolution. However, this esteemed position is linked with great responsibility, both on part of the Government and the media itself.

A major obstacle for Pakistan's media is the fact that the Federal Government's internationally acclaimed draft Right to Information Bill has still not been presented in front of the Parliament for passage. The Bill was radically revised from its original form that was approved by the Senate's Standing Committee on Human Rights.

Ironically, the Federal Government has modeled this bill on the Freedom of Information Ordinance 2002, which it is already trying to repeal due to its ineffectiveness. Instead of allowing public access to information, the new bill has strengthened the Government's hand to consolidate its hold on information under the reasons of 'public interest.'

Apart from this, it has come to be noted that Pakistan's electronic and print media has come a long way

from the Pakistan Television being the only channel hitting the airwaves. Media in Pakistan saw a boom from the year 2001 onwards when private news channels were allowed to work. This resulted in mushrooming of news channels, which expanded the media horizon.

Revenue from advertisements is the primary monetary source for all forms of media outlets in Pakistan. Thus, the providers of the advertisements have a huge influence on those outlets. Telecommunication companies, banks, real estate developers, among others, are the main sources of advertisements for media. They are the ones on whom Pakistani media relies for its financial survival. Therefore these businesses have huge influence on the conduct of the media outlets. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that when the Supreme Court ordered halting of construction of a part of Bahria Town in Karachi in September 2016, only two media outlets reported on the issue.

In addition, it has been observed in the case of various media outlets that their coverage tilts in favour of certain political parties explicitly. For example, Samaa TV and ARY TV are decidedly pro-PTI and anti-Government. On the other hand, Geo TV is decidedly anti-PTI.

It is perhaps for this particular reason that according to PILDAT's Public Opinion Poll, although the Federal Government's performance in ensuring the freedom of media and that it carries out its duties within confines of the law was the highest rated highly at 64%, the ratings of the nation-wide respondents seemed to be on the borderline at 51% with regards to whether the Media ensured that it is behaving professionally and is reporting in a balanced and accurate manner. However, this only denotes that although public opinion has firmly become positive regarding the Government's management of Media affairs, it can swing either way with regards to the Media exhibiting responsibility itself. Thus, questions still persist regarding public trust and confidence in Pakistan's media, which is considered to be one of the four pillars of a democracy.

Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector

The civil-military imbalance in Pakistan seems to have increased during 2016, with the Military leadership seemingly establishing itself as the final arbiter on national security and certain domains of our foreign policy. The elected Government on the other hand appeared to be relegated to either an auxiliary role, or a parallel national security regime.⁴ Therefore, although a narrative of the civil-military leadership '*being on the same page*' was perpetuated partly through 2015, the relationship remained frayed at best.

Perhaps the PML-N-led Federal Government's biggest failure has been its inability to institutionalize a consultative decision-making process on national security despite the creation of the National Security Committee (NSC) in 2013 complete with a permanent secretariat. 2016 shows that just the lack of institutionalization of national security decision making through the National Security Committee has resulted in the following:

- i. Since its creation, the NSC has only met 6 times till December 2016, with a dismal periodicity of six and a half months, even though Pakistan has had more than its fair share of security-related challenges. In countries with far less serious national security crises, such as the United Kingdom, Prime Minister chairs weekly meetings of the National Security Council, before the Cabinet meeting.
- ii. To further compound this aversion to institutionalization, the Prime Minister has instead chosen to interact directly with the Chief of Army Staff, which has not only undermined the entire process of institutionalized consultation but also the office of the Federal Minister of Defence as well as the National Security Advisors

In light of the dormancy of the National Security Committee, urgent reforms are required in its workings, which are as follows:

- i. Pakistan's National Security Committee, unlike its equivalent institutions of National Security Councils the world over which are only *consultative* in nature, is defined as per its rules as the country's '*principal decision-making body on matters of national security*'. This, decision-making power, as opposed to a consultative role, in our view, undercuts the authority of the Federal Cabinet and must be revised. If, however, the Government wishes to retain the decision-making status of the NSC, in our view, an Act of Parliament is required to regulate the workings of the NSC. This act should also set regular periodicity of NSC meetings to be at least once a month if not weekly.
- ii. Linked to the above is the membership of the NSC, which has non-Federal Cabinet members as its full-time members, including Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) and the three Services Chiefs. This composition is an anomaly both nationally and internationally where military commanders do not have membership positions but join NSC meetings upon invitations. Labeling the forum as the National Security Committee of the Cabinet, as the current Government has done so with membership to non-cabinet members, is inappropriate in this respect.
- iii. Perhaps another aspect requiring improvement is the infrequency of NSC meetings. As shared above, the Prime Minister and COAS have apparently preferred doing business through one-on-one meetings since Gen. Raheel Sharif's appointment in November 2013 till July 2016 (of a total of 99 meetings, 37 were held as one-on-one interactions versus 6 meetings of NSC in 3 years). It increasingly appears that official consultation and institutionalized decision-making at the officially designated forum is not a priority.

Pakistan continued without a full-time Defence Minister even during 2016. Khawaja Asif, the federal minister for water and power, was given the additional charge for the Ministry of Defence in November 2013 and given the heavy agenda his original ministry of water and power carries to solve the electric power shortage crisis (commonly referred to as 'Load Shedding'), it is hardly plausible that he can devote a decent amount of time to Ministry of Defence.

Another major issue during 2016 has been that of effective implementation, or lack thereof, of the National Action Plan (NAP) and rather unfortunate open and repeated finger-pointing between the civil and military leadership as on the question of its implementation.

The Military leadership has shown an unfortunate inclination to sit publically in judgment of the performance of the Elected Government. While the Military leadership was quick to point out the Federal Government's alleged lagging performance on the NAP, it congratulated its own performance with regards to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an operation that also sees the elected Government shying away from the required oversight based on targeted objectives and timeline of Zarb-e-Azb.

The Elected Government appears to be unable to display the proactive leadership that is particularly required with regards to the implementation of the NAP. For example, there is no clear indication of the progress achieved by the various Committees formed by the Prime Minister to implement the NAP. Additionally, the Federal Government has also not till yet brought a comprehensive legal package to reform Pakistan's justice system, which necessitated the 21st Constitutional Amendment leading to the formation of Military Courts. As the Constitutional Amendment is set to expire on January 06, 2017, the Government may go back to the parliament and seek extension of the Military Courts. None or negligible legislative periodic oversight has been exercised by the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies on the implementation of the NAP. For example, the Senate's Committee on Interior has convened only a single meeting on the issue, whereas the National Assembly's Standing Committee on Interior was unable to convene a meeting on it even once during June 2015-July 2016. Provincial Assemblies standing

committees on home affairs also did not do any better.

More than anything, the biggest loss has been of the public's knowledge on the status of the implementation of the NAP, as the Government has been unable to share regular updates in this regard. The same is true of the national security institutional structures devised after the NAP, including the Provincial Apex Committees, whose formation was announced through an ISPR Press Release on January 03, 2015. PILDAT believes that there is an urgent need to formalize the terms of reference of the Apex Committees, including their membership, scope of work (Terms of Reference), periodicity of meetings, etc.

The aforementioned trends are symptomatic of a larger malaise facing civil-military relations in Pakistan, which PILDAT believes can be primarily defined by two characteristics:

1. The Civilian Elected Government at present, and similar governments in the past, have failed to institutionalize national security management by institutionalizing a consultative process on vital national strategic issues. This has strengthened the perception that elected governments are neither serious nor methodical in making well-considered decisions on vital national security issues.
2. The Military leadership continues to feel that the final onus of deciding 'national interest' is on them. As a result, at times, instead of giving their input and then leaving the matter to the elected leadership of the country, insist on their interpretation of the national interest relating to issues such as relations with India, Afghanistan, Iran and the US and the security policy.

Internal Democracy of Political Parties

Political parties constitute an integral part of a robust democratic order, with the strength of their internal democracy being a marker of the democratic culture they espouse for and perpetuate. However, 2016, as in 2015, only saw mostly negative developments in relation to internal democracy of political parties. As has been observed, the most well established political parties of the country, with the fairest electoral prospects (such as PML-N and PPP) continue to be mere lengthened shadow of their leaders. Additionally, political parties' funding remains shrouded in ambiguity with the ECP's capacity to check compliance with law in this regard seriously under doubt.

Some of the major developments with regards to internal democracy of political parties during 2016 are as follows:

Postponement by PTI of its Intra-party Elections

The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has delayed its intra-party elections yet again. On April 11, 2016, PTI Chairman Imran Khan had announced that the party's intra-party elections had been postponed in view of the circumstances created by the leaks of the Panama Papers. The intra-party elections were originally supposed to take place on April 25, 2016.

The saga of PTI intra-party elections had started soon after the party had held its first elections in March 2013 followed by the verdict of the election tribunal in October 2014, dissolution of all elected bodies in March 2015, formation of an interim-party structure with the same office-bearers in the same month and constitution of an independent election commission for intra-party election, formulation of new election rules in September 2015 under the leadership of Mr. Tasneem Noorani, membership drives, training of election coordinators, formulation of an election procedure and the election schedule and then resignation of Mr. Tasneem Noorani in March 2016.

The democratic credentials of the party has taken more than a few knocks. More than two years have

passed in this process and the party has failed to hold fresh elections or even announced a time frame to hold these elections. With this, PTI has joined the ranks of most political parties in Pakistan who rely on nominations by the top party chief for various party positions rather than holding intra-party election. PTI had made impressive progress under Mr. Tasneem Noorani in preparations for the intra-party election. The most difficult and time-consuming job of preparing members' database was completed; election procedure was finalized and a procedure for voting by cell phone was also devised. Instead of successful holding of intra-party election in PTI setting an example for other political parties as we had hoped earlier, it seems that PTI has instead joined the ranks of other parties with weak internal democracy.

New Chief Minister of Sindh Appointed Without any Party Consultation

PPP surprised the country by replacing a veteran loyalist of the party and the Chief Minister of Sindh, Syed Qaim Ali Shah, MPA, with the Provincial Finance Minister, Syed Murad Ali Shah, MPA, and now, the new Chief Minister of Sindh on July 25, 2016. This decision came as a result of a meeting convened by the party Co-chairman Mr. Asif Ali Zardari in Dubai that primarily took place for the purpose of expanding the scope of special policing powers of Rangers in the whole province.

The spokesperson for Mr. Zardari, Senator Farhatullah Babar, said that more changes would be made to the Sindh cabinet besides replacement of the Chief Minister. Syed Qaim Ali Shah, MPA, tendered his resignation to the Governor of Sindh, Dr. Ishrat-ul-Ibad and accepted by him on July 27, 2016. Maula Bux Chandio, Adviser to the Sindh Chief Minister on Information, told the media that party Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari had decided to bring 'young leadership' in the province for its betterment and growth.

Keeping in line with the tradition of the party, a major decision such as this came around again apparently without any institutional consultation within the party but by the top party leadership resident outside Pakistan.

The Debacle of Mr. Altaf Hussain and Subsequent Implosion of the MQM

Political parties in Karachi have been complaining against what they term a partisan hue of the Karachi Operation as the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) has been trying to clean up the militant wings of both the MQM and the PPP. Regardless of the political-criminal nexus that seems to persist in Karachi, they were recurrent statements by the MQM that it was '*pushed against the wall*' without any avenue being offered for addressing its grievances. However, nobody expected the MQM to self-implode in such a regrettable manner. The cause is none other than Mr. Altaf Hussain, who seems to be both the saviour and a bane for the party.

Under a gag order by the Lahore High Court, and upheld by the Supreme Court, any coverage of the speeches of Mr. Altaf Hussain by the national media are banned. This however did not stop him from spewing his vitriolic venom, a culmination of which was seen in his incitement to violence against media houses and anti-Pakistan remarks on August 22, 2016. Mr. Altaf Hussain, since the Rangers' raid on the MQM headquarters Nine-Zero in March 2015, has made such disgraceful public speeches at least on 30 occasions before.

The consequence seems to be that the fourth largest party in the National Assembly, and the second largest in the Provincial Assembly of Sindh, seems to have lost its credibility, especially with regards to its patriotism and sentiments for the country. More than anything, the party has also effectively splintered into four groups, with little cohesion between them, and animosity guiding their relationship with each other.

Given that the MQM has dissociated itself not only from Mr. Altaf Hussain's statements, but also any role in the party, it seems to be making amends for the unforgivable. However, it faces an uphill task not only

with the electorate, but also the Federal Government, the Provincial Government of Sindh and the military leadership. In what can only be termed as an all-out purge, at least 67 offices of the party have been leveled in Karachi, with efforts to eradicate any symbols of support for Mr. Altaf Hussain in Karachi. The great paradox is that the MQM still firmly seems to be a part of the electoral landscape of Pakistan, with its Mayors and Deputy Mayors being elected for the Karachi and Hyderabad Metropolitan Corporation.

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz holds Intraparty Elections

On October 18, 2016, around 2,000 members of the PML-N National Council gathered together to elect the party's central office-bearers.

Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif was re-elected unopposed as President of the party. Earlier before his election, Chaudhry Jaffar Iqbal had announced that Prince Abdul Qadir Baloch had submitted nomination papers to contest for the seat of Party President against Mr. Nawaz Sharif, but his papers were rejected, as he was not even a member of the party's National Council.

As expected, most of the old faces were re-elected as the party's central office-bearers. Leader of the House in the Senate Raja Zafar-ul-Haq was elected unopposed as Chairman of the PML-N.

Electoral Process and Management

The one major development related to electoral process and management for 2016 was the passage of the 22nd Constitutional Amendment. The 22nd Amendment to the Constitution brought about much-needed and long-demanded reform in the qualification of the Chief and Members of the Election Commission of Pakistan. This change, however, only fulfills one requirement of the many crucial, but still pending, electoral reforms. The piecemeal approach to electoral reforms reflects the absence of required focus on the issue by the Parliament. The Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms, formed on July 24, 2014, had set a term of completion of its work in 3 months. Regrettably, however, after more than two years of its work, it has, so far, failed to table a comprehensive package of electoral reforms in the Parliament.

More often than not, it is witnessed that instead of bringing important legislation in time, the Government moves in at the eleventh hour to do the needful. Apparently the passage of the 22nd Amendment was prompted by the approaching completion of the term of the 4 ECP members who retired in June 2016.

The negative trend of rushing important legislation through the Parliament, without the requisite debate in the legislature, and any input from concerned stakeholders, including members of the civil society, media, etc. has been going on for a while. Earlier, the all-important 21st Constitutional Amendment, which paved the way for formation of Military Courts, was passed after only 174-minutes of debate in the National Assembly.

When it came to the appointment of the Members of the Election Commission of Pakistan, following the passage of the 22nd Constitutional Amendment, both the Federal Government and the National Assembly again seemed to have been remiss in timely initiation of the process. Despite the fact that it was very well known that the four members of the Election Commission would retire on June 12, 2016, neither the Prime Minister initiated the process of consultation with the Leader of the Opposition nor the Speaker National Assembly constituted the Parliamentary Committee for the appointment of members of the EC in time. The Speaker constituted the Parliamentary Committee on June 14, two days after the

four ECP members had retired and the EC had become dysfunctional.

Panama Leaks and Weakening Accountability Structures in Pakistan

Although the emergence of accountability in and of itself as an issue for Pakistan's democracy is not a negative development, there seemed to be a regress with regards to the accountability structures and their political ownership within Pakistan for the period under consideration.

Consider the open threats made by the Prime Minister to the National Accountability Bureau on February 16, 2016, when he warned the accountability watchdog to stay 'within its limits' and not harass the Government employees, otherwise action would be taken against it.

This open threat came at the heels of the growing trend of targeting accountability institutions by the executive. Earlier the PPP-led Sindh Government had criticized the NAB in the harshest terms and the PPP had introduced a bill in the Senate to clip the NAB Powers. The PTI-led Government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through an amendment also clipped the powers of the provincial Ehtesaab Commission for the period under consideration.

The accountability debate has been at the centre stage of Pakistan's democracy for the period under consideration, given the emergence of the 'Panama Leaks', along with the Military leadership finally taking decisive action on the NLC Scam involving retired senior military officers and the COAS publically dismissing from service 6 army officers involved in corruption in Balochistan.

Given PTI's announced lockdown of Islamabad on November 02, 2016, old fears of alleged covert support of military behind the PTI agitation resurfaced again.

Although PTI has a democratic right to protest, and it is a totally different debate whether it should protest inside the democratic forums it is elected to or disrupt citizens lives, it has been observed that the party and its Chairman show little, if any, restraint towards leaning on the military to oust what it has termed to be its key foe – the elected Federal Government of the PML-N. Mr. Imran Khan's penchant for using cricket terms in politics such as the '*Umpire's Finger*' to wrap up the elected political system were on full display ahead of the November 2 planned lockdown of the country's capital, just as those were extensively used before and during the 126-day long *Dharna* in 2014.

In what perhaps defines PTI's leading strategy of the end justifying the means, it appears that the party has no qualms in exploiting the not-so-hidden differences in civil-military relations at this time. Consider for instance, the statement by PTI's Senior Vice President, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA that '*the current distance between the military and civil government is not of ordinary nature*'. According to a leaked video of his address to party workers on October 17, 2016 in Islamabad, Mr. Qureshi reportedly said the ongoing relations between the civil and military leadership were not different than those in 1999. In the context of Mr. Imran Khan's earlier statement of endorsing a military coup against the civilian government led by prime minister Nawaz Sharif when he said "*people would celebrate and distribute sweets if there was a military takeover in Pakistan*", he seemed to be echoing the same when he said that if anything happened to the country's democratic setup, the Prime Minister would be responsible for it.

In the checkered history of fledgling democracy between 4 coup d'états in 7 decades of Pakistan's history, espousing and advancing of such a policy for a political party that is a recipient of 16.92% of the popular votes in General Election 2013, along with the party forming the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is not just inappropriate for the party and its democratic ethos but extremely dangerous for the country.

Two leading political parties of Pakistan, having learnt their respective lessons at the cost of huge disruption to democratic process during the decade of 1990s, signed a Charter of Democracy³ essentially agreeing to respect electoral mandate of representative governments and not to undermine it through extra constitutional means. Isn't it time that as a popular political party with a trailblazing record of galvanizing public support and changing its fortunes from 1 seat in the National Assembly in 2002-2008 to 33 seats in the current National Assembly, PTI should have faith in its own popularity, mandate and policies, and sign the Charter of Democracy?

It is a welcome development that the party has returned to the Parliament by December 15, 2016, which is the right forum to agitate upon the issue

More than anything, the emergence of the 'Panama Leaks' and the subsequent maelstrom over the issue highlights the weakness of Pakistan's accountability institutions, especially the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). Given the wide-ranging powers that NAB enjoys and the resources at its disposal, it has been disappointing to witness NAB's inactivity over the Panama Leaks issue.

PILDAT believes that in the face of such crises, the stakeholders involved start to seek out the formation of new institutions, rather than reforming the ones already in place. The real issue that needs to be debated is the reluctance and inability of the existing structures to investigate the matter. The serious question is why such institutions as NAB, FBR and FIA do not automatically spring up into action whenever a suspected case of mega corruption or wrong-doing comes to light. In the case of FBR and FIA, one may easily pin-point the lack of independence hampering their initiative but it is completely understandable in the case of NAB which is a fairly independent institution with its head appointed through a bi-partisan process involving Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly.

Pakistan has experimented with a number of models to address the menace of white-collar corruption. One major weakness in the laws controlling these institutions was the unbridled power of the ruling party to appoint and remove the heads of these institutions. A major improvement in the law governing NAB was introduced through the National Accountability (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 when the appointment of the NAB Chairman was required to be made through a bipartisan process involving the consultation with the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly. Consultation with the Leader of the Opposition by the Prime Minister required under this amendment was made meaningful and effective after the Supreme Court specified the extent and requisites of the consultation. Following these two developments, NAB has attained, to a great extent, the position of a truly independent entity largely protected from partisan influences.

However, the National Accountability Bureau has come under increasing scrutiny by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, especially for its reluctance to pursue mega-corruption cases, instead choosing to devote its efforts to cases that should actually be pursued by the Provincial Anti-Corruption Bureaus.

Parliament and especially the Standing Committees of the Senate and National Assembly on Law and Justice have a special responsibility in this context. Parliamentary Committees should hold special meetings to ask NAB the reasons for its dormancy in the context of the recent Panama leak. Although the National Assembly unanimously voted on August 17, 2016 for a motion to set up a joint 20-member Parliamentary Committee to make recommendations for changes in the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO), the issue is not with the law as it is considered one of the best accountability laws in the world. The issue is with the implementation of the law and the conduct of the persons at the helm of affairs.

Institution of Local Governments

With the indirect elections for Punjab completed on December 22, 2016, Local Government elections were completed for Balochistan, KP, Punjab, Sindh, Islamabad Capital Territory and Cantonment Boards.

Although the process was started in November 2014, Punjab and Sindh particularly continued to delay the formation of Local Governments, even though there was relentless pressure by the superior judiciary on the issue.

The period under consideration has made manifest, yet again, the reluctance on the part of the Provincial Governments to delay institutionalization of functional local governments on one pretext or the other. For example, the ECP quite literally had to coerce the Provincial Governments of Sindh and Punjab to issue the schedule for elections on indirect seats in February 2016. This was followed by the introduction of a last-minute ordinance by both the Provincial Governments to amend the voting procedure from secret ballot to the show of hands. This was eventually struck down by the country's judiciary, showing that democratic checks and balances are in place, even though the democratic spirit may be missing.

Regardless local government elections have still not been held in FATA, although the Committee on FATA Reforms in its Report has recommended to do so. Additionally, the consequences of clipped powers of the local governments also seem to raise a number of questions which will intensify with time, as evinced by the Muttahida Quami Movement's recurrent demands to also devolve the police, revenue and agricultural departments to the local governments as well.

Punjab particularly has regressed on the devolution of power with the formation of Committees headed by the unelected bureaucracy at the level of each and authorities at the provincial level which do not leave any real power in the hands of the elected Local Government officials.

Table 3: International IIDEA Scores

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	% Score Assigned in January 2017	% Score Assigned by DAG in December 2015	% Score Assigned by DAG in July 2014	% Score Assigned by DAG in September 2013	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2012	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2011	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2010	% Score Assigned in pre-2008	Average Score (%) of 2012, 2011, 2010 and pre -2008
1	Citizenship, Law and Rights	42	43	43	55	45	49	46	42	46
1.1	Nationhood and Citizenship	50	50.5	49	67	55	59	54	42	53
	Overarching Question: Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without discrimination?									
1.1.1	How inclusive is the political nation and state citizenship of all who live within the territory?	50	42	44	46	49	57	51	43	50
1.1.2	How far are cultural differences acknowledged, and how well are minorities and vulnerable social groups protected?	37	41	40	42	39	41	40	43	41
1.1.3	How much consensus is there on state boundaries and constitutional arrangements?	60	60	57.5	61	69	67	61	55	63
1.1.4	How far do constitutional and political arrangements enable major societal divisions to be moderated or reconciled?	45	50.5	45	47	51	59	56	41	52
1.1.5	How impartial and inclusive are the procedures for amending the Constitution?	55	58	55.5	58	71	72	62	41	61
1.1.6	How far does the government respect its international obligations in its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and how free from arbitrary discrimination is its immigration policy?	55	52	54	57	59	61	58	54	58
1.2	Rule of Law and Access to Justice	34	41	40	51	44	47	43	35	42
	Overarching Question: Are state and society consistently subject to the law?									
1.2.1	How far is the rule of law operative throughout the territory?	37	36	37.5	39	36	43	33	33	36
1.2.2	To what extent are all public officials subject to the rule of law and to transparent rules in the performance of their functions?	37	37	39	41	36	40	39	39	38

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	% Score Assigned in January 2017	% Score Assigned by DAG in December 2015	% Score Assigned by DAG in July 2014	% Score Assigned by DAG in September 2013	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2012	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2011	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2010	% Score Assigned in pre-2008	Average Score (%) of 2012, 2011, 2010 and pre -2008
1.2.3	How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference?	45	59	54.5	57	70	67	60	33	57
1.2.4	How equal and secure is the access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration?	37	39	35	37	40	45	43	35	41
1.2.5	How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due rules of impartial and equitable treatment in their operations?	37	38	39	41	42	41	40	38	40
1.2.6	How much confidence do people have in the legal system to deliver fair and effective justice?	48	38	35.5	39	40	47	40	35	40
1.3	Civil and Political Rights	42	42	43	57	44	49	47	46	47
	Overarching Question: Are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all?									
1.3.1	How free are all people from physical violation of their person, and from fear of it?	35	35	37	39	39	41	34	39	38
1.3.2	How effective and equal is the protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly?	50	52	50.5	53	52	59	56	47	54
1.3.3	How secure is the freedom for all to practice their own religion, language or culture?	43	40	45	47	45	47	48	54	49
1.3.4	How free from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights?	38	40	41	43	44	50	48	44	46
1.4.	Economic and Social Rights	37	38	38	47	38	40	40	40	39
	Overarching Question: Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all?									
1.4.1	How far is access to work or social security available to all, without discrimination?	34	32	36.5	38	35	37	39	39	37
1.4.2	How effectively are the basic necessities of life guaranteed, including adequate food, shelter and	30	33	33.5	35	31	35	31	39	34

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	% Score Assigned in January 2017	% Score Assigned by DAG in December 2015	% Score Assigned by DAG in July 2014	% Score Assigned by DAG in September 2013	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2012	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2011	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2010	% Score Assigned in pre-2008	Average Score (%) of 2012, 2011, 2010 and pre -2008
1.4.3	To what extent is the health of the population protected, in all spheres and stages of life?	33	31	32.5	34	29	32	33	34	32
1.4.4	How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including education in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship?	38	39	36	38	35	40	41	40	39
1.4.5	How free are trade unions and other work-related associations to organize and represent their members' interests?	46	46	45	47	46	48	49	38	45
1.4.6	How rigorous and transparent are the rules on corporate governance, and how effectively are corporations regulated in the public interest?	42	44	46.5	49	49	50	48	44	48
2	Representative and Accountable Government	40	42	42	57	45	47	43	38	43
2.1	Free and Fair Elections	49	50	48	50	58	58	50	43	52
	Overarching Question: Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies?									
2.1.1	How far is appointment to governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, and how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?	55	56	52	55	58	54	51	39	51
2.1.2	How inclusive and accessible for all citizens are the registration and voting procedures, how independent are they of government and party control, and how free from intimidation and abuse?	50	53	51	54	61	61	53	50	56
2.1.3	How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and parties, and how far is there fair access for them to the media and other means of communication with the voters?	63	63	57.5	61	71	67	53	53	61

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	% Score Assigned in January 2017	% Score Assigned by DAG in December 2015	%Score Assigned by DAG in July 2014	%Score Assigned by DAG in September 2013	%Score Assigned by DAG in 2012	%Score Assigned by DAG in 2011	%Score Assigned by DAG in 2010	%Score Assigned in pre-2008	Average Score (%) of 2012, 2011, 2010 and pre -2008
2.1.4	How effective a range of choice does the electoral and party system allow the voters, how equally do their votes count, and how closely do the composition of the legislature and the selection of the executive reflect the choices they make?	50	53	49	52	54	55	51	40	50
2.1.5	How far does the legislature reflect the social composition of the electorate?	38	38	37.5	39	47	50	42	35	43
2.1.6	What proportion of the electorate votes, and how far are the election results accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?	40	35	38.5	41	54	53	50	40	49
2.2	The Democratic Role of Political Parties	46	47	46	67	52	52	51	41	49
	Overarching Question: Does the party system assist the working of democracy?									
2.2.1	How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage with the public and campaign for office?	58	58	56	59	71	66	63	47	62
2.2.2	How effective is the party system in forming and sustaining governments in office?	50	52	50	53	56	56	56	45	53
2.2.3	How far are parties effective membership organizations, and how far are members able to influence party policy and candidate selection?	35	37	36	38	40	40	59	36	44
2.2.4	How far does the system of party financing prevent the subordination of parties to special interests?	35	36	39	41	40	40	39	38	39
2.2.5	To what extent do parties cross ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions?	50	50	48	51	51	54	56	41	50
2.3	Effective and Responsive Government	36	38	38	53	40	39	38	39	39
	Overarching Question: Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns?									

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2.3.1	How far is the elected government able to influence or control those matters that are important to the lives of its people, and how well is it informed, organized and resourced to do so?	38	38	42	44	47	41	36	40	41
2.3.2	How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies?	39	42	46	48	45	46	44	41	44
2.3.3	How open and systematic are the procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation, and how equal is the access for relevant interests to government?	36	36	36	38	40	44	39	36	40
2.3.4	How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?	35	34	32.5	34	33	35	34	39	35
2.3.5	How comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens to government information under the constitution or other laws?	34	45	39.5	42	45	40	43	39	42
2.3.6	How much confidence do people have in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to influence it?	32	30	32.5	34	30	29	31	38	32
2.4	The Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament	45	47	48	63	52	52	50	40	48
	Overarching Question: Does the Parliament or Legislature contribute effectively to the democratic process?									
2.4.1	How independent is the Parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions?	38	46	51	54	59	53	54	38	51

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2.4.2	How extensive and effective are the powers of the Parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation?	48	57	55	58	58	60	61	41	55
2.4.3	How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?	39	39	43.5	46	47	46	44	38	44
2.4.4	How rigorous are the procedures for approval and supervision of taxation and public expenditure?	38	38	40	42	38	39	38	39	38
2.4.5	How freely are all parties and groups able to organize within the parliament or legislature and contribute to its work?	57	56	50.5	53	55	57	56	38	52
2.4.6	How extensive are the procedures of the parliament or legislature for consulting the public and relevant interests across the range of its work?	42	42	43.5	46	39	47	42	37	41
2.4.7	How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents?	56	57	55.5	58	58	61	60	47	56
2.4.8	How well does the parliament or legislature provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern?	40	41	44.5	47	58	55	48	40	50
2.5	Civilian Control of the Military and Police	30	32	32.5	34	39	35	26	25	31
	Overarching Question: Are the military and police forces under civilian control?									
2.5.1	How effective is civilian control over the armed forces, and how free is political life from military involvement?	30	32	32.5	34	39	35	26	25	31
2.5.2	How publicly accountable are the police and security services for their activities?	34	35	35	37	40	37	33	29	35
2.5.3	How far does the composition of the army, police and security services reflect the social composition of society at large?	47	50	48	51	49	56	51	41	49

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3.1.1	How independent are the media from government, how pluralistic is their ownership, and how free are they from subordination to foreign governments or multinational companies?	48	53	48.5	51	63	56	56	53	57
3.1.2	How representative are the media of different opinions and how accessible are they to different sections of society?	47	49	51	54	65	62	67	52	62
3.1.3	How effective are the media and other independent bodies in investigating government and powerful corporations?	53	54	53	56	63	62	62	51	59
3.1.4	How free are journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?	40	40	43	45	43	51	48	46	47
3.1.5	How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment by the media?	35	37	32.5	34	40	49	52	40	45
3.2	Political Participation	46	50	46	57	49	55	52	43	50
	Overarching Question: Is there full citizen participation in public life?									
3.2.1	How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc., and how independent are they from government?	52	52	51.5	54	60	65	63	48	59
3.2.2	How extensive is citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity?	50	50	49	52	53	56	53	45	52
3.2.3	How far do women participate in political life and public office at all levels?	45	48	43.5	46	44	54	49	45	48
3.2.4	How equal is access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented within it?	35	36	38	40	39	43	42	39	41

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	% Score Assigned in January 2017	% Score Assigned by DAG in December 2015	% Score Assigned by DAG in July 2014	% Score Assigned by DAG in September 2013	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2012	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2011	% Score Assigned by DAG in 2010	% Score Assigned in pre-2008	Average Score (%) of 2012, 2011, 2010 and pre -2008
3.3	Decentralization	40	41	40	50	40	44	47	40	43
	Overarching Question: Are decisions taken at the level of government that is most appropriate for the people affected?									
3.3.1	How independent are the sub-central tiers of government from the centre, and how far do they have the powers and resources to carry out their responsibilities?	43	43	43	45	43	48	53	43	47
3.3.2	How far are these levels of government subject to free and fair electoral authorization, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation?	40	40	39.5	42	43	46	48	40	44
3.3.3	How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?	37	40	37	39	35	37	41	38	38
4	Democracy Beyond the State	42	43	41	50	47	51	43	37	44
4.1	External Influences on the Country's Democracy	37	40	39	42	43	49	40	34	42
	Overarching Question: Is the impact of external influences broadly supportive of the country's democracy?									
4.1.1	How free is the country from external influences which undermine or compromise its democratic process or national interests?	35	37	39	41	42	52	35	32	40
4.1.2	How equitable is the degree of influence exercised by the government within the bilateral, regional and international organizations to whose decisions it may be subject?	42	45	40.5	43	47	57	41	39	46

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	% Score Assigned in January 2017	% Score Assigned by DAG in December 2015	%Score Assigned by DAG in July 2014	%Score Assigned by DAG in September 2013	%Score Assigned by DAG in 2012	%Score Assigned by DAG in 2011	%Score Assigned by DAG in 2010	%Score Assigned in pre-2008	Average Score (%) of 2012, 2011, 2010 and pre -2008
4.1.3	How far are the government's negotiating positions and subsequent commitments within these organizations subject to effective legislative oversight and public debate?	33	37	36.5	38	41	39	32	32	36
4.2	The Country's Democratic Impact Abroad	46	46	44	59	50	53	45	40	47
	Overarching Question: Do the country's international policies contribute to strengthening global democracy?									
4.2.1	How consistent is the government in its support for, and protection of, human rights and democracy abroad?	41	41	38	40	50	51	42	38	45
4.2.2	How far does the government support the UN and agencies of international cooperation, and respect the rule of law internationally?	58	58	53	56	66	65	54	50	59
4.2.3	How extensive and consistent is the government's contribution to international development?	50	51	47.5	50	49	58	48	39	49
4.2.4	How far is the government's international policy subject to effective parliamentary oversight and public influence?	33	34	38.5	41	36	39	34	31	35
	Aggregate	42	45	42	54	46	49	45	40	45



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